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Sprawling out from the Canadian coast of frigid Lake Ontario lies Toronto, the bustling and 
cosmopolitan center of Canada’s largest metropolitan area. Home to a host of cultures 
originating from across the world, Toronto is remarkable in the breadth of languages one can 
hear spoken throughout the city, among them Tamil, a Dravidian language native to the Indian 
subcontinent. A traveler visiting Toronto and looking to hear Tamil spoken would probably be 
sent to Scarborough in East Toronto. Scarborough, a neighborhood of great diversity, is a 
microcosm of the multiculturalism in Toronto and in Canada as a whole; minorities make up 
more than 65% of the population, with South Asian and Chinese residents constituting more than 
40% of the neighborhood’s total population. It is here in Scarborough, amidst this diversity, that 
a visitor will encounter the largest urban concentration of Sri Lankan Tamils anywhere in the 
world, including Sri Lanka1. 
 
                                                 
1 Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah. “Tamil Diaspora Politics,” in Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee 




Fleeing civil war back home, a few thousand Sri Lankan Tamils started to settle in Canada, 
largely in Toronto, beginning in the mid-1980s. Their numbers increased rapidly throughout the 
decade and by 1990 the Sri Lankan Tamils had become the largest group of refugee claimants in 
Canada2. As a bloody civil war raged in Sri Lanka throughout the 1990s, Canada received a 
steadily growing influx of Tamil refugees.  By 2006, there were an estimated 200,000 Tamils in 
Canada, more than a quarter of whom called Scarborough home3. 
Today, one finds a thriving Sri Lankan Tamil community in Scarborough. Indeed, it is hard 
to miss the Tamil imprint on the Scarborough landscape. A cursory glance at the Scarborough 
telephone directory reveals hundreds of evidently Tamil-owned businesses. There is even a 
Tamil chamber of commerce for Scarborough and a Tamil community directory of businesses 
and services, Thamilar Mathiyil (Amidst Tamil), several hundreds of pages thick, listing 
businesses that offer goods and services ranging from legal and accounting services to jewelry 
and wedding dresses.  
Walking along Jane Street, one of Scarborough's major thoroughfares, one encounters Tamil 
language billboards advertising fruits and vegetables in a manner reminiscent of a large 
Chinatown. The Tamil convenience store at the corner of Jane and Finch offers ten weekly Tamil 
language newspapers, most of which have sections on the Sri Lankan civil war. Inside the store 
blares one of the four Tamil language radio stations broadcast over the air.  An intrepid visitor 
can get into a discussion with the storeowner, a Sri Lankan Tamil from Jaffna, Sri Lanka, who 
might direct the visitor to the Kalaivaany Book Depot, a Tamil language bookstore on East Finch 
                                                 
2  Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Report on joint fact-finding mission to Sri Lanka: security and human 
rights, situation, entry and exit procedure and personal documentation, issue paper, 2002, Ottawa, 5 
3 City of Toronto Community Council Profile: Scarborough 2006. 
The size of the Sri Lankan Tamil community in Canada is disputed. Estimates range from 200,000 to 400,000.         
However, I use the conservative official figures.  
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Avenue. On his way to Kalaivaany, as it is known among Tamils, the visitor would pass by the 
R.G. Education Center, one of several Tamil language schools in Toronto, as well as the nearby 
Capital Driving School, a Tamil language driving school.  After visiting the bookstore, the 
visitor can then go to one of the three neighborhood cinemas that show only Tamil language 
movies.  Looking for more Tamil language entertainment, one also has a choice between two 






The short narrative above, gleaned from personal experience, shows a strong and established 
Sri Lankan Tamil community that had successfully recreated its culture in Toronto. The 
Canadian-Sri Lankan Tamils enjoy a unique situation as compared to fellow Sri Lankan Tamils 
who fled the island elsewhere in that the former have been minimally subjected to host 
government assimilation pressures. Canada is widely regarded among immigrant-rights circles as 
a liberal bastion for immigration, asylum and refugees4. This is largely due to the liberal 
Multiculturalism policy of the Canadian state, which encourages its ethnic communities, 
particularly immigrant communities, to “retain their individuality” and “racial elements” once in 
Canada5. Indeed as the country with the highest per capita immigration rate in the world, 
Canada’s national identity has decidedly blossomed into an identity of multi-nationalism6. Thus, 
the members of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada have retained their distinct home-
identities far more than their diasporic brethren in other Western countries. In 2007, the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora, including Canadian-Sri Lankan Tamils, is estimated to be over a million 
strong.7 
                                                 
4  Vicki Squire, The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum (London: Palgrave, 2009) 53-6. 
 Squire discusses how Europe tightened its immigration and asylum policies through the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999. The Treaty saw the development of a Europe wide asylum policy which was more restrictive with interstate 
cooperation. In the UK, the conservative governments of Thatcher and Major went even further. The 1988 
Immigration Act of United Kingdom reduced the rights of dependents of asylum seekers and exponentially 
increased the asylum refusal rate. In the 1990s, a series of Acts pertaining to immigration and asylum were passed 
restricting entry, cutting welfare spending on asylums, restricting rights of appeal and imposing carrier sanctions. 
 On the other hand, in Canada, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001 completely overhauled the already 
liberal immigration policy to an even more welcoming position. As the first major legislation on immigration after 
1976, the Act took on a holistic approach to ensure higher immigration and refugee admission while paying 
particular attention to economic, social and cultural wellbeing of the would be immigrants, asylums and refugees. 
The stipulations and the spirit of the Canadian legislation are in stark contrast to those of European immigration 
legislation. (the text of the Act is available on the Department of Justice, Canada Website: www.justice.gc.ca) 
5  Doug Saunders, “Canada’s Mistaken Identity,” The Globe and Mail, June 27, 2009. 
6  Benjamin Dolin and Margaret Young, “Canada’s Immigration Program,” Policy Paper, Law and Government 
Division, Library of Parliament, September 10, 2008. 




Given their numbers, it is no surprise that the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada wields 
immense influence over the civil war in Sri Lanka, which will be briefly discussed in Chapter 
One. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada has also, as compared to other international 
diasporic Tamil communities, traditionally been the most vocal among the supporters of Eelam, 
the separate homeland demanded by indigenous Tamils8 in Sri Lanka, as well as the most prolific 
financiers of the LTTE (Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam), an organized group of armed 
militants, fighting the Sri Lankan government on behalf of their proposed Eelam state in the 
island of Sri Lanka9. Moreover, given that over 800,00010 of the 1,587,10011 Tamils in Sri Lanka 
are internally displaced, and that many of the undisplaced are being silenced by the Sri Lankan 
state, the overseas diaspora is at the forefront in the call for Eelam. Among those making 
demands, the Canadian Sri Lankan Tamils are the loudest. 
The activism of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Canada was most visible during the first 
half of 2009, when tens of thousands took to the streets of Toronto to protest the Sri Lankan 
government’s actions as the civil war finally drew to a close. While the Sri Lankan Tamils had 
previously demonstrated in the streets of Toronto, the wave of protests in 2009 was exceptional 
in both its numbers and its composition. The numbers of protesters swelled, largely because of 
                                                 
8  Indigenous Tamils of Sri Lanka are those who have traditionally inhabited the island, whom I refer to as Sri 
Lankan Tamils to differentiate from the Tamils of Tamil Nadu in South India. The distinction is also useful to 
differentiate the Sri Lankan Tamils from Tamils of recent Indian origin, whom I refer to as Indian Tamils, who were 
first brought into the island by the British in the 19th century to work the tea, coffee and rubber plantations. The 
Indian Tamils have not demanded a separate state. 
9  “Funding the Final War: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora,” Human Rights Watch, Volume 
18, No. 1 (C) 2006, 12. 
 The article traces LTTE intimidation and extortion of Sri Lankan Tamils in the West. However, it makes clear that 
most contribute willingly to the LTTE while only a small minority is coerced.  The article also points out that a 
significant proportion of Sri Lankan Tamil business ventures in Canada, particularly Toronto, are partly funded by 
the LTTE. 
10 Acharya, Ethnic Conflict and Refugees in Sri Lanka, 108. 
11 Sri Lanka Census Report, 2001. 
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the sudden and uncharacteristic presence of tens of thousands of second generation Sri Lankan 
Tamils in the streets.  
The level of second generation engagement was welcomed by the Sri Lankan Tamils in the 
diaspora and the LTTE12. The Tamil Guardian, on January 2009, said: “They [the diaspora] too 
have stepped up shows of solidarity with the liberation struggle through protests and vigils, with 
younger Tamils at the forefront of organizing events13.” Less than three months later, with the 
war about to come to a close, the Tamil Guardian front page headline read: “Second Generation 
Diaspora Leads Global Protest Against Genocide14.”  
However, many Sinhalese15 Sri Lankans greeted this surprising development with scorn and 
derision. For instance, a South Asia Intelligence Review Assessment prepared with collaboration 
from government officials declared on May 25th 2009 that: “the events of recent weeks have 
even further radicalized the younger generation of Tamils abroad … Second generation Tamils 
who were born overseas have now become separatists in a way that they were probably not 
before. The risk of Diaspora elements linking up with surviving LTTE cadres to once again 
threaten security and peace in the North and elsewhere in Sri Lanka cannot entirely be written 
off16.” The Sinhalese were also questioning the motives of the second generation protesters. 
                                                 
12 Tamilnet, “Expanding Role of Diaspora Youth in Political Activism,” Sunday, 16 February 2008, 21:12 GMT. 
13 Tamil Guardian, “Sri Lanka targets Tamils diaspora, but they too resist,” January 21, 2009. 
14 Tamil Guardian, April 15, 2009. 
15 The Sinhalese are the majority in Sri Lanka and effectively control the state. Sri Lankan Tamil separatism, even 
though directed at the state, is in reaction to discriminatory policies of previous Sinhalese dominated governments of 
independent Sri Lanka.   
 The total Tamil population in Sri Lanka has decreased proportionately in two decades from 1981 to 2001. Sri 
Lankan Tamils consisted of 12.7% of the population in 1981 while the Sinhalese comprised 74%. In 2001, Sri 
Lankan Tamils had been reduced to 4.3% while the Sinhalese had increased to 82%. The total Tamil population in 
Sri Lanka, including the Indian Tamils had been reduced to 9.3% in 2001 from 18.2% in 1981. 
 (Sri Lanka Census Reports, 1981, 2001) 
16 Ajai Sahni, “Out of Chaos,” South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 7, No. 46, 
May 25, 2009. 
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Having grown up in Canada, being alien to the realities of Sri Lanka, what was at stake for them? 
What made the second generation take to the streets? 
This thesis will attempt to arrive at an answer to these questions by drawing upon scholarly 
sources in anthropology and history. The short description above of Sri Lankan Tamils in 
Toronto through the eyes of a fictive visitor announces the substantial role of anthropology in 
this thesis. The reasons for this role are two-fold. First, the vast majority of historical works on 
diaspora nationalism and refugee settlement in the West rely heavily on anthropology. Second, 
diaspora nationalism is a continuous phenomenon informed as much by culture as by history. 
Therefore, anthropology can be fruitfully employed with history to better understand the thesis 
topic. 
This thesis employs three concepts: remembrance, forgetting and ignorance, from an 
anthropological point of view, and explores how history is narrated across generations in order to 
arrive at an answer. Remembrance, or memory, is the presence of knowledge while forgetting is 
the erasure of that knowledge. Ignorance, however, is the “presence of an absence17.” In other 
words, ignorance is the absence of knowledge which arises in a generation as a consequence of 
the gaps in remembrance and forgetting in the previous generation. Furthermore, ignorance does 
not manifest itself as a total absence of knowledge, but rather appears as fragmented, disjointed 
narratives of history, marred by conspicuous gaps. It is important to note that ignorance is not 
used pejoratively here.  
The three concepts above are examined through three dominant issues that arose during my 
interviews in Canada. These three issues largely underline the way second generation Sri Lankan 
Tamils relate to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The first issue is their remembrance of their parents’ 
                                                 
17 Dhooleka Sarhadi Raj, “Ignorance, Forgetting, and Family Nostalgia: Partition, the Nation State, and Refugees in 
Delhi,” Social Analysis 44(2) 2000: 30. 
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houses in Sri Lanka. The second issue is their interpretation of their “Tamilness” in almost 
universal terms, disregarding the diversity that characterizes the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. 
The third issue is the grim view they hold of Sri Lanka, in which Tamils are killed, tortured and 
raped everywhere with impunity, and in which the government, aided by the Sinhalese majority, 
actively plots to victimize the Tamils.  
These three issues are symbolic of the three anthropological concepts and will serve as 
subjects to evaluate remembrance, forgetting and ignorance among the second generation. This 
thesis argues that selective remembrance and forgetting by the first generation have led to 
ignorance in the second generation, and that this ignorance has allowed the LTTE to mobilize the 
second generation by imposing the LTTE's own narrative of the civil war.  
The first chapter sets the groundwork for this thesis by briefly discussing the ethnic conflict 
in Sri Lanka from 1948, when Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain to May 2009, when 
government forces defeated the LTTE to bring the civil war to an end. The chapter will close by 
setting the backdrop to my research and describing a mass Sri Lankan Tamil demonstration in 
Toronto. The second chapter explores how the selective remembrance of large houses in Eelam 
and adherence to an ethic of hard work among the first generation emphasized in the second 
generation's understanding of Eelam the idea of prosperity. The third chapter looks at how the 
selective forgetting of differences and social hierarchies among the first generation, struggling to 
assimilate into an egalitarian society, has led to a nebulous sense of fraternity and unity among 
the second generation. 
The fourth chapter examines how the LTTE, taking advantage of the ignorance of the 
second generation, created a new national narrative of history that is considered “official” among 
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the Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada, which I call the “Master Narrative18.” The fifth and final 
chapter will discuss the catalyst – the final phase of the war and the impending defeat of the 
LTTE – for the protests in Toronto and the second generation's participation. The chapter will 
show that the second generation’s interpretation of the events during this period provided a 
compelling motive to demonstrate. In fact, the protests in Toronto galvanized the second 
generation Sri Lankan Tamils into action.  
This thesis is particularly the product of thirty-four interviews conducted among Sri Lankan 
Tamils in Toronto during Thanksgiving and Winter breaks, more than six months after the end of 
the civil war in Sri Lanka. My meetings with Sri Lankan Tamils were initiated through my 
cousins in Toronto who facilitated my research by introducing me to their friends. The 
interviews sometimes turned into discussions between generations as on occasion parents joined 
in the conversations. My initial objective was to research how second generation Sri Lankan 
Tamils in Toronto narrate the history of Sri Lanka. However, the discussions almost always 
turned to the civil war, genocide against Tamils in Sri Lanka and Black July in 198319. The 
interviews largely determined the direction the research took as well. For instance, the websites, 
newspapers, movies, etc, used in the thesis were all first mentioned and explained to me by the 
interviewees with a unique second generation Sri Lankan Tamil perspective. 
Aside from the solicited interviews, many other unplanned interviews were also conducted 
when some Tamils spontaneously referred me to their friends. These meetings turned out to be 
                                                 
18 Master narrative is a variation of the meta narrative concept of Jean Francois Lyotard, first put forth in The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge , (Manchester: Manchester University, 1979). Since then the 
concept has been analytically applied to many diasporic discourses. See Andrea O’Reilly, ed., Cuba: Idea of a 
Nation Displaced (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), 4. 
19 The pogrom in July 1983, now infamously known as Black July, was a watershed in Sri Lanka’s ethnic relations, 
in which Sinhalese mobs attacked and killed Tamils and looted Tamil property for about a week. The events in 
Black July will be discussed in detail in chapter one.  
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some of the most exciting and useful. For instance, my cousin referred me to Lemo, a twenty 
seven year old Sri Lankan Tamil, who had to cut short our meeting because he was late for 
volleyball practice. However, as we left his house he promised me a meeting with his cousin and 
teammate Siva, another Sri Lankan Tamil, twenty years old. Almost two hours later, at about 
11.30 pm, Lemo asked me to come to the Youth Center in Scarborough to pick up Siva, who was 
willing to talk with me. I drove to the Youth Center with my cousin and picked up Siva who 
turned out to be the most enthusiastic and articulate Sri Lankan Tamil I interviewed. Siva and I 
spoke in the back seat while my cousin drove for about an hour across Toronto. After a short pit-
stop of twenty minutes at a Tim Hortons, we finally dropped Siva at his house at 2.30 am. 
Retrospectively, I realize that my research was conducted mostly among middle class, 
relatively well-off Sri Lankan Tamils. However, this positively contributed to my research as 
most of the Sri Lankan Tamils that took to the streets of Toronto belonged to this group.. My 
thirty-four second generation subjects were overwhelmingly Hindu and had settled in Canada in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. They were mostly born in Sri Lanka, but had been very young – 
usually below five years – at the time of migration. Twenty-eight were born in Sri Lanka, four in 
Canada, and one each in the United Kingdom and Germany. They were also a relatively well 
educated group. Twenty-six were either in college or had completed college and twelve were in 
white-collar professions. Out of the nineteen male and fifteen female subjects, none were 
married, with the youngest twenty and the eldest twenty-eight. Most of the parents, the first 
generation, spoke English, although not always fluently. Interestingly, a majority of the second 
generation Tamils did not speak or read Tamil, although most could understand conversations in 
Tamil between parents. As a result, they relied largely on English language media for 
information, which also eased my research, as I do not speak Tamil. 
11 
 
My sample of interviewees, although not chosen with this in mind, is representative of the 
majority of second generation Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto. For instance, the gender balance in 
the sample is a plausible representation of the second generation in Toronto because of the large 
number of Sri Lankan Tamil single males who still continue to immigrate to Canada. However, 
my sample’s representativeness of their socio-economic position in Canada is doubtful because 
no reliable studies are available on the socio-economic position of second generation Sri Lankan 
Tamils. 
Apart from my interviews, I focused mostly on www.TamilNet.com and the Tamil 
Guardian newspaper. Tamilnet is the mouthpiece of the LTTE and the website most visited by 
the second generation. In fact, many had the website in their bookmarks and some even as the 
homepage of their internet browsers. More importantly, upon further research, it was evident that 
for the Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto, Tamilnet was the source of almost all the media 
information about Sri Lanka that they consumed. All of the community newspapers, radio 
stations, TV stations and publications by Tamil organizations cited information from Tamilnet, 
available also in French and German, on a daily basis. The Tamil Guardian is a biweekly 
newspaper distributed free of charge across the globe among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. In 
all respects, it is the print equivalent of Tamilnet and is largely directed toward the 
technologically unsavvy. I use the 26,692 news reports and 510 feature articles that appeared 
from Tamilnet from June 1997 to May 2009 and the 110 issues of Tamil Guardian distributed 
from January 2005 to June 2009. 
Despite their visibility in Toronto, very little has been written about the Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora in Canada and almost nothing has been written about the second generation. For 
instance, authors and researchers tend to use Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and “Other” as 
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categories when discussing the South Asian diaspora in Canada. This category of “Other” 
includes immigrants from all other South Asian countries. Even though a significant portion of 
the “Other” may be Sri Lankan Tamil, they tend to fade into invisibility in analysis. There may 
be two reasons for their invisibility. Firstly, Canada has many other immigrant groups in massive 
numbers compared to Sri Lankan Tamils. Most of the research seems to be on Eastern European 
immigrants such as Ukrainians and Poles and other “non-traditional” groups such as Blacks and 
Indians from the Caribbean islands. Secondly, Sri Lankan Tamils’ dual identity, as both Tamils 
and Sri Lankans, results in a partial overlap with the ethnic Tamils of South India on the one 
hand and with Sri Lankan nationals generally on the other. Therefore, they are usually grouped 
together with other Sri Lankans such as Sinhalese and the Muslims or with Tamils from India. 
As a result of this ambiguous space between the Sri Lankans (nationality) and Tamils (ethnicity), 
the distinct identities and experiences of the Sri Lankan Tamils tend to disappear in the wider 
analysis. 
Finally, for clarity I use Sri Lanka throughout the thesis to refer to the island even though 
the name was changed from Ceylon, the British name for the island, to Sri Lanka only in 1972 
with the advent of the republican constitution. I also use Sri Lankan Tamils, as mentioned before, 
to differentiate the indigenous Tamils of the island from the Tamils in Sri Lanka who are of 
recent Indian origin who trace their ancestry to South India.  By first generation, I refer to those 
who migrated to Canada as adults, while I use second generation to refer to those who reached 
Canada before ten years old. In my sample of thirty-four second generation Sri Lankan Tamils, 
only five were born in Canada; twenty-eight were born in Sri Lanka, but had migrated to Canada 




Chapter 1              Background and Setting 
 
 
Post-independence Sri Lanka and the Ethnic Conflict 
Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain on February 4, 1948 on the heels of Indian, 
Pakistani and Burmese independence. For the first time in more than four hundred years, Sri 
Lankans were governing the entire island after repeated colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch 
and British since the sixteenth century. While there were several minor ethnic disturbances – the 
largest being the Sinhalese-Muslim riots in 1915 – the colonial period was mostly marked by 
political and ethnic unity among the Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims against the colonial 
powers20. 
At the time of independence, the island was home to diverse groups of peoples. Sinhalese, 
Tamils of various origins, Sri Lankan Moors21, European Burghers22 and other Indian and Malay 
groups inhabited the island adhering to four major religions – Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and 
Christianity, both Roman Catholic and Protestant23. The first post-independence acts of ethnic 
disunity came immediately following independence in the form of the Citizenship and Franchise 
Acts of 1948 and 1949, which disenfranchised the Tamils of Indian origin. The Tamil Congress’ 
support of the acts created a deep rift within the party which resulted in the creation of a new 
Tamil party, the Federal Party, by break-away groups from the Congress. The new party was led 
                                                 
20 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Company, 
1988), 56-7. 
21 Sri Lankan Moors are the Muslims of Arabian descent who settled in the island over the past millennium. Most 
arrived in the island as traders from the Middle East, East Africa and via India. The overwhelmingly male Arab 
settlers later intermarried with local groups resulting in a Sri Lankan Moor population distinct from other Muslim 
groups such as the Malays who arrived in the island during the long years of colonialism.  
22 Burghers are the descendents of Portuguese and Dutch settlers in the island during the 16th and 17th centuries. 
After independence most migrated out of Sri Lanka and settled mostly in Australia. 
23 In 1946 census, just before independence ethnicity and religion were distributed as follows: Sinhala 69.5%, Sri 
Lankan Tamil 11%, Indian Tamil 11.7%, Sri Lankan Moors 5.5% and Buddhists 64.5%, Hindus 20%, Christians 9% 
and Muslims 6.5%. 
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by Mr. Chelvanayakam, a leading member of the Tamil Congress24. The first major 
discriminatory legislation against all Tamils, both Sri Lankan and Indian, came in 1956 
following the election of a new populist government of Bandaranaike. The Language Act of 
1956 made Sinhalese the only official language of the country and required Tamils in the civil 
service to lean Sinhalese within three years or face retirement25. 
As ethnic tensions were rising in the island, several attempts by the Sinhalese and Tamil 
leaders to achieve a compromise were vehemently opposed and sabotaged by extremist 
Sinhalese-Buddhists led by Buddhist monks. 1971 saw the first large scale eruption of violence 
in the island since independence. Ironically, it was the rural Sinhalese youth who rose against the 
government in a Marxist insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) and attempted 
to overthrow the government. Having brutally crushed the insurrection, the government of Sri 
Lanka proceeded to enact increasingly authoritarian measures, a process which has been 
continued by successive Sri Lankan governments to the present day26. Since 1971, governments 
have constantly resorted to brutal violence against the Sri Lankan citizenry and repeatedly 
compromised both democracy and civil liberties with impunity. 
In 1972, the government rushed through the parliament a new republican constitution and 
renamed the island Sri Lanka (from Ceylon), while doing away with many constitutional 
protections to minorities and checks on government power. 1972 also saw the passing of the 
Universities Act which established ethnic quotas and standardization of exam marks for 
university admissions with significantly higher marks required from Tamil students than from 
                                                 
24 E. Valentine Daniel, Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 113-4. 
25 K. M. de Silva, Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 
1993), 280-5. 
26 Patrick Peebles, The History of Sri Lanka (London: Greenwood Press, 2006), 120. 
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Sinhalese students. The ethnic fallout was predictable as university education had been the main 
path to employment among the Sri Lankan Tamils for decades. Having been shut out from the 
Civil Service, the drastic reduction in access to higher education finally put thousands of Sri 
Lankan Tamils youth in a massively disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their Sinhalese 
counterparts27. 
The mid 1970s also saw the proliferation of numerous Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups 
carrying out clandestine acts of violence, robbery and arson who called for redress against 
discrimination. However, their crude methods, a lack of support among the mainstream Sri 
Lankan Tamil population and the electoral weakness of moderate Sri Lankan Tamil political 
parties allowed the government to evade addressing Tamil youth grievances. The situation 
continued to worsen until 1983 with the membership in Tamil militant groups numbering in 
several dozen each28. 
July 1983 was a watershed in ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. Since the late 1970s a cyclic 
pattern of violence had emerged in which the Tamil militants would carry out small scale attacks 
for which the government would retaliate with disproportionate violence which in turn would 
inspire more violence from Tamil youth. The violence spiraled out of control as negotiations 
between the government and Tamil political parties failed. On July 22, 1983, the LTTE 
ambushed and blew up an army patrol in Jaffna and killed thirteen soldiers, all of whom were 
Sinhalese. The attack shook both the government and the Sinhalese population as the largest 
single attack to date. Many newspapers, even the moderate English language newspapers, added 
fuel to the fire by describing the attack as a massacre29. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 124-6. 
28 Ibid., 152-3. 
29 Ibid., 135-6. 
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The following day, the government flew the bodies of the soldiers to Colombo to hold a 
mass funeral. However, before the funeral could be held, the mass gathering erupted in violence 
and turned into an anti-Tamil rampage that devastated Colombo and parts of the island. Tamil 
homes and businesses were systematically targeted, burned or looted. As violence intensified, 
looting and arson turned into outright murder of Tamil civilians. Initially, the government did 
little to stop the violence and reports surfaced of armed forces and police personnel standing idly 
by as Sinhalese mobs looted Tamil homes and killed Tamils30. 
In many respects, the events of July 1983, now infamously known as Black July, marked the 
start of the civil war in earnest. The events convinced the already embittered Tamils that they 
could not rely on the government of Sri Lanka for safety, and the resulting alienation from the 
government provided ready recruits for Tamil militant groups, as Tamil youth joined the militias 
in droves. Black July also crystallized the call for Eelam, which found support even among the 
Sri Lankan Tamils who were in general conservative. The majority of the Colombo Tamils who 
were affected was conservative and voted for the two mainstream, largely Sinhalese, political 
parties. They were living among the Sinhalese and had until then rejected the extreme politics of 
Tamil youth militias. However, with their property looted and an estimated 400 to 3000 killed in 
mob violence31, thousands of Tamils fled the island and found asylum mainly in the West and in 
India. Later, a million-strong Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora formed the financial and propaganda 
backbone of Tamil separatism32. 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 135-6. 
31 Frances Harrison, “Twenty Years on – riots that led to war,” BBC News, July 23, 2003. 
 The Massacres in Sri Lanka During the Black July Riots in 1983, May 13, 2008, The Online Encyclopedia of Mass 
Violence, Sciences Po, 10. 
 The official estimate is 371 deaths. The disparity is largely due to state censorship of media. 
32 Acharya, Ethnic Conflict and Refugees in Sri Lanka, 108. 
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The events of 1983 also marked the beginning of the darkest decade in the island's post-
colonial history, seeing the country experience a full scale civil war, an armed Marxist 
insurrection of Sinhalese youths in the South, a military intervention by India, and a string of 
assassinations and suicide bombings in which almost the entire top crust of the country's political 
and military leadership was assassinated. Beginning in late 1983, India, under Indira Gandhi, 
began training and arming Sri Lankan Tamil militias in Tamil Nadu, India. Violence continued 
to increase rapidly as attempts at negotiations, facilitated by India, failed in 1985.  By late 1987, 
India, then under Rajiv Gandhi, was fighting the Sri Lankan Tamils in the North and East of Sri 
Lanka. At the same time, the Sri Lankan government was fighting a more brutal armed Marxist 
insurrection by the Sinhalese youth in the south33. 
By 1994, the government had finally changed after seventeen years of rule by one party and 
the Indian military had withdrawn. However, tens of thousands of Sinhalese lay dead in mass 
graves, killed by the government’s own forces, while thousands of Tamils were being killed in 
the civil war, more often than not by rival Tamil militia groups. The economy was in shatters and 
the Sri Lankan President Premadasa and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were killed by 
LTTE suicide bombers34. Thousands of professionals and academics emigrated from the island 
and tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils sought asylum in the West. 
The entire population of the island greeted 1994 with optimism as they elected a new 
government which campaigned on a peace platform. However, their optimism soon proved 
misplaced as peace talks with the LTTE failed and the civil war resumed in 1995. War continued 
until the beginning of peace attempts yet again in 2002. Peace talks soon failed in 2003, but the 
                                                 
33 K. T. Rajasingham, “Accord Turns to Discord,” in Sri Lanka: The Untold Story  
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html  
34 BBC News, “Tamil Tiger ‘regret’ over Gandhi,”  June, 27 2006, 17:42 GMT. 18:42 
 Jonathan Lyons, “Suicide bombers – weapon of choice for Sri Lanka rebels,” Reuters, August 20, 2006. 
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Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) established in 2001 remained in effect until the government 
unilaterally withdrew their agreement in 2008. The resumption of the civil war saw heavy 
fighting and heavy casualties on both sides, but by June 2009, Asia’s longest running civil war35 
had come to an end as the government declared victory following the death of LTTE leadership. 
Tens of thousands lay dead and hundreds of thousands were withering in refugee camps. 
                                                 






Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada 
Canada has been the most popular destination for the Sri Lankan Tamils asylum seekers 
because of its liberal asylum policies. The first stream of Sri Lankan Tamils seeking asylum 
arrived in Canada almost immediately after Black July in 1983. The stream of asylum seekers 
continued for several years, consisting mostly of single males in their twenties and thirties. 
Generally, families would pay for the migration of the eldest son (usually) by mortgaging 
houses, selling jewelry and land and sometimes even furniture. The son, after having established 
himself in the West, would sponsor a Sri Lankan Tamil bride from Sri Lanka and later both his 
and his wife's entire family, including parents, siblings, nephews and nieces36. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that, aided by liberal Canadian immigration and citizenship policies, the initially small 
numbers of largely single male Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers turned into thousands of Sri 
Lankan Tamil families by the end of the 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s37. 
By 2006, Sri Lankan Tamils were one of the most visible38 minorities in Canada and had 
established in Canadian cities strong communities, popularly known as “Little Jaffnas” among 
Canadians.  Toronto, however, has been the most popular destination for Sri Lankan Tamils and 
                                                 
36 Christopher McDowell, A Tamil Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland 
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), 139. 
 In the first study of its kind about the Sri Lankan diaspora, McDowell discusses the migration patterns of Sri 
Lankan Tamils since 1983, the home country push factors and the pull factors in the West. Even though his 
discussion is on the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Switzerland, the migration patterns out of Sri Lanka were the 
same for Canada as it was for Switzerland. Moreover, as McDowell notes, Canada is not a country of first entry, 
which means Sri Lankan Tamils seeking asylum in Canada must reach a “first destination” and subsequently make 
the journey to Canada because there are no direct flights to Canada from Sri Lanka. He further notes that 
Switzerland along with the Middle East and Eastern European countries were the most favored countries of first 
destination for Sri Lankan Tamils making the long journey to Canada. 
37 Feng Hou, “The Initial Destinations and Redistribution of Canada’s Major Immigrant Groups: Changes over the 
Past Two Decades,” Statistics Canada Research Paper for Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, 2005, 
10. 
38 According to Statistics Canada, visible minority “applies to persons who are identified according to the 
Employment Equity Act as being non-Caucasian in race or non-white in color. Under the Act, Aboriginal persons 




is believed to be the home of more than half of the Sri Lankan Tamil population in Canada. 
Greater Toronto’s Sri Lankan Tamil population was largely concentrated in Scarborough and 
nearby Mississauga in the 1980s and 1990s. A decade later, having established a thriving 
community, the Tamils are now moving East to areas such as Pickering, Ajax, Markham and 
Whitby, leaving distinctly ethnic neighborhoods for more middle class surroundings39. 
However, the community appears to have retained a distinct cohesiveness amidst the 
scattering of its members. The largest, if not most dramatic, expression of this cohesion came in 
the early part of 2009 when tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils held mass demonstrations for 
several days at a time, protesting alleged human rights abuses of the government of Sri Lanka 
and calling for an end to hostilities in the final phase of the civil war40. 
                                                 
39 Sean Durak, “Newcomers Find a Home in Scarborough,” Inside Toronto, March 30, 2003. 
 There are no reliable studies to prove this phenomenon. As mentioned in the introduction, the most widely used 
categories of original nationality and language spoken at home do not portray a comprehensive picture of Sri Lankan 
Tamils in Canadian Statistics. However, the Sri Lankan Tamil community widely believes in this phenomenon. 
Moreover, in the history of immigration and immigrant communities, this is not an unprecedented. 
40 The final phase was fought from January to May 2009. In late 2008, the government had established a “no-fire 
zone” for the Tamil citizens of the regions previously controlled by the LTTE. However, as the government forces 
advanced the LTTE cadres and its leadership retreated into the no-fire zone with the Tamil citizens. Thus the final 
phase was characterized by government attempts to break into the no-fire zone, which was now heavily fortified and 
guarded by the LTTE. The no-fire zone, a patch of coastal land of 17 square kilometers, was believed to have 
housed more than 200,000 Tamil civilians. 
 The government was accused of using heavy weapons on the no-fire zone in its attempts to break through LTTE 
barriers, inevitably killing thousands of Tamil civilians. The LTTE, on the other hand, was accused of forcibly using 
the Tamil population as a human shield.  
 Reliable numbers of casualties are not available due to extreme and highly effective government censorship of all 




April 26-30, 2009. Tamil demonstration on University Avenue, Toronto 
 
 





The above photographs are of the Sri Lankan Tamil demonstration held opposite the United 
States Consulate on University Avenue, Toronto, a major street in the city. The demonstration 
was held from April 26th to the 30th, urging the United States to move against the Sri Lankan 
government, which had disregarded the unilateral permanent ceasefire declared a few days ago 
by the LTTE, a banned organization in Canada41. However, for many Sri Lankan Tamils in 
Canada, the LTTE was the only organization fighting for their rights “back home” and its leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, their savior. 
                                                 
41 Preety Bhattacharji, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (aka Tamil Tigers),” Council on Foreign Relations 
Backgrounder, May 20, 2009. 
 The LTTE has been proscribed in more than 32 countries. The United States proscribed the LTTE in 1997 and the 
United Kingdom in 2001. The EU and Canada only followed in 2006 despite overwhelming evidence of LTTE fund 
raising and intimidation within their territories. This may reflect the large number of Sri Lankan Tamils living in 
Canada and within the EU and their successful lobbying efforts.   
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On Sunday the 26th, carrying the Tamil Eelam flag, thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils 
descended upon University Avenue, closing both north- and south-bound lanes. On Wednesday 
the 29th, at about 4.30 p.m., the demonstrators attempted to push past the police barriers, which 
resulted in a scuffle between police and the demonstrators, which resulted in the subsequent 
arrest of fifteen demonstrators. The next morning, at about 8.30 a.m., the police moved the 
demonstrators off the road and cleared the University Avenue for traffic after more than four 
days42. 
In many ways, the wave of demonstrations that gripped Toronto was unprecedented for the 
Sri Lankan Tamil community in Toronto. However, the most striking aspect was the presence of 
second generation Sri Lankan Tamils in large numbers. The second photograph above shows a 
young second generation Sri Lankan Tamil, leading the demonstration with a bullhorn. In front 
of him are several older Sri Lankan Tamils seated on the street. The photograph captures an 
unseen transformation in the Sri Lankan Tamil community in Toronto that only came to the fore 
during the demonstrations. For many, the demonstrations saw the passing of the nationalist 
mantle from the first generation who grew up in Sri Lanka to the second generation who grew up 
in Canada43. The photograph is illustrative of this larger phenomenon observed in the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diaspora, in which the first generation stepped back, fatigued, their methods defeated, and 
made way for the second generation to carry the torch. After sending millions of dollars to fund 
the LTTE and carrying out LTTE propaganda in Canada44 for more than two decades, the first 
                                                 
42 CBC News Canada,“University Avenue reopened to traffic, Tamil protest continues,” April 30, 2009. 
 Emily Mathieu and Robyn Doolittle, “15 Arrested at Tamil Protest, Police Say,” The Toronto Star, April 29, 2009. 
43 Lesley Ciarula Taylor, “Tamil Support Out in the Open: Civil War Carnage in Sri Lanka Sparks New Wave of 
Militancy among Young People,” The Toronto Star, April 06, 2009. 
44 Human Rights Watch, Funding the Final War, Volume 18, No. 1 (C) 2006. 
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generation is no longer at the forefront. Instead, a young speaker has taken up the bullhorn, while 
the elders watch seated.  
 
Research Setting 
Before moving on to the second chapter, the circumstances and the immediate context in 
which my interviews took place should be noted. The bulk of this thesis is based on semi-
structured interviews conducted with two generations of Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto during a 
period in which the past as the second generation understood it was connected to the present. 
Even though by November 2009 the tensions within the community had somewhat subsided and 
demonstrations had become a thing of the past, my trip to Toronto during the Thanksgiving 
break coincided with the Maavir Day (Heroes Day), which aroused emotional tensions within the 
community once more. Several of my interviewees were particularly tense because I am 
Sinhalese. Several vigils were held in Toronto for the thousands who died in the final phase of 
the civil war, and the tens of thousands of Tamil civilians who were still held in refugee camps 
remained a hot topic in the community45. The Maavir Day, falling on the 27th of November, was 
held in honor of the dead lauded by the LTTE as martyrs, especially suicide bombers, a number 
of whom would eventually be inducted into a hall of martyrs during a yearly ceremony. The 
celebrations also coincided with the much anticipated annual speech delivered by the leader of 
the LTTE, Prabhakaran. 
                                                 
45 The government claimed to keep the civilians in the camps in order to identify surviving LTTE cadres and other 
militants. The refugees’ prolonged stay was justified by the need to make sure that all traces of the LTTE were 
eliminated so as to not risk another uprising. However, the Sri Lankan Tamils claim the camps to be concentration 
camps for the Tamils. They point to the government quarantine of the camps and restrictions on all media access to 
the camps as evidence. Moreover, the Sri Lankan Tamils claim that the government is forcibly concentrating the 




Until the demise of the LTTE, Maavir Day was marked by massive celebrations, cultural 
activities and the annual speech of Prabhakaran. In November 2008, in London for example, a 
large celebration was held in East London attended by thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils. While I 
was politely asked to leave the premises because I was Sinhalese, I saw attendees donating £20 
notes in droves and even several €50 notes46. For many people the event was an emotional 
experience as they listened to speeches, news and other important information about the situation 
in Sri Lanka. Thousands, from the very young to the very old, attended the celebrations, which 
also served as an occasion to meet friends and family from all corners of London, the United 
Kingdom and even the European Union. However, in 2009, in Toronto, the situation could not 
have been more different. 
While Toronto was known to hold the world's largest Maavir celebrations, in 2009, six 
months after the end of the war, there was a palpable sense of uncertainty in the community. 
Maavir celebrations have always been clouded in secrecy, with invitations only sent through 
word of mouth; in 2009 the celebrations had gone almost underground. Even some of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils I interviewed did not know specific information about the Maavir celebrations 
even though some were expecting a dramatic reappearance of Prabhakaran47. Eventually, on 
November 27, the celebrations turned out to be low-key, and disjointed. Instead of large 
                                                 
46 The Euros were probably from Sri Lankan Tamils from the European Union. Hundreds of thousands of Tamils 
sought asylum in Europe and systematically settled in key countries of Western Europe. Many have relatives living 
in several countries in Europe and it is common to find family connections across the English Channel. 
47 A common belief among the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils before Maavir Day was that Prabhakaran had 
staged his death in order to avoid the government onslaught, escaping to continue the struggle. Many expected him 
to deliver a dramatic speech on the 27th as usual.  However, after the 27th, the common answer was that he was 
biding his time and secretly gathering his forces for a more favorable time. Most also gave a logical answer with 
remarkably similar details explaining why Prabhakaran was still alive. The similarity in details and the order in 
which the different, seemingly logical, explanations were given suggested that the explanations originated from a 
single source.  
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gatherings, several small uncoordinated celebrations were held in Toronto, in which attendees 
took oaths to continue to advocate for Eelam. 
The English version of the oath, directed toward particularly toward the second generation, 
stated: 
On this holy day when heroes 
who sacrificed their lives for the 
motherland of Tamil Eelam are remembered, 
I undertake this oath that as an Eelam Tamil, 
wherever in this world I live, 
achieving Tamil Eelam is my conviction and that 
I will act with commitment and 
will work relentlessly for the retrieval of 
separate, independent and sovereign Tamil Eelam 
which is my historical country. 
Quest of Tamils is the motherland of Tamil Eelam.48 
 
More interestingly, two messages claiming to have come from the LTTE (not from 
Prabhakaran as before) were circulated in Toronto. One claimed to be from the moderate faction 
of the LTTE and called on all moderate Sri Lankan Tamils to repudiate advocating violence and 
begin reconciliation. The other message, claiming to have come from the LTTE secret 
headquarters in Sri Lanka, toed the usual LTTE line of determinate belligerence. It was clear that 
Maavir Day in 2009, unlike in the years before, had failed to galvanize the Sri Lankan Tamil 
community in Toronto. 
                                                 




Chapter 2              Remembering Eelam 
“To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely
49
.”- Edmund Burke 
 
“All diaporic discourses share certain common features… some of us have constructed an idea 
of a lost ancestral home in the interstitial space between history and dreams, and on the shifting 






Today Eelam stands, almost exclusively, for the separate and independent homeland on the 
island of Sri Lanka demanded by the Sri Lankan Tamils. However, this fusion of Eelam with 
separatism is a relatively recent phenomenon which had not yet fully formulated it territorial 
contours during the 1980s when most Tamils began emigrating from Sri Lanka. The territorial 
claims had not reached their maximum limits by the end of the 1980s as the Tamil militants, led 
by the LTTE, were in the process of taking over the Tamil nationalist movement in Sri Lanka 
from the more moderate Tamil political parties. For instance, the district of Puttalam appears in 
maps of Eelam only in the 1990s. Eelam reached its maximum area during the 1990s under the 
exclusive patronage of the LTTE, which by the turn of the decade had established itself as the 
sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils by force of arms51. 
Because a large portion of first generation Sri Lankan Tamils immigrated in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, their understanding of Eelam is different from that of the second generation, 
who were educated on the phenomenon once it had reached maturity. In this chapter, I use two 
topics that arose during my interviews to illustrate a larger theme among the second generation 
Sri Lankan Tamils. The second generation’s memories of Eelam usually included large houses 
                                                 
49 Mark Carnes and Gary Kates, Rousseau, Burke, and Revolution in France 1791 (New York: Longman, 2005), 95. 
50 O’Reilly, The Politics of Mis-ReMembering, 177. 
51 The territorial aspect of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter. 
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(with household servants at times) their parents left behind in Sri Lanka and an ethic of hard 
work and industriousness that was considered genetic, resulting in an emphasis on prosperity, a 
phenomenon I call “Golden Eelam." Incidentally, large houses and a hard working ethic were 









Recollection, or remembrance, usually known as memory, is widely studied and theorized. 
While there is no consensus on what constitutes memory52, or the relationship between collective 
memory and individual memory, several aspects of the concept are largely agreed upon today. 
There is a wide consensus that memory is continuously refigured and reconstructed based on 
how we perceive the past, present and future. According to Meir Litvak, a senior researcher at 
the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv and an Arab Palestinian 
scholar, “the social function of memory is to reconstruct the past as well as to legitimize the 
present and a much coveted future53.” In this sense, memory is not static, but a continuously 
developing, nebulous concept that directly responds to events and experiences. Another widely 
agreed upon aspect of memory is that it is largely, but not exclusively socially determined54. 
Social mores and norms are believed to set the framework with which we construct and 
reconstruct memory. Memory serves as a prism that filters and magnifies, perhaps at the same 
time. 
In this chapter I focus on the dynamism and the social determination of memory of Eelam 
among the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto. I will further discuss how memory is 
translated into the second generation, who grew up in a Western society facing a completely 
different social framework than their parents. For clarity, I use recollection, remembrance and 
memory interchangeably. The two topics of large houses and an ethic of hard work are used to 
illustrate three of the main functions of remembrance.   
 
                                                 
52 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, Introduction to War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jay Winter 
and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1999), 1. 
53 Meir Litvak, ed., Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 13. 




According to Litvak, the major social functions of remembrance are to reconstruct a suitable 
past, to legitimize the present and look forward to a “much coveted future.55” David Lowenthal 
concurs: “the past thus conjured up is, to be sure, largely an artifact of the present56.” Similarly, 
the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto use large houses and a hard working ethic to 
project backward and forward respectively from their present condition57. Large houses are used 
by the first generation to legitimize and assume social status while the hard working ethic is used 
to ensure that the same social status is maintained. 
Before addressing the reasons for legitimizing the past and ensuring its continuity, it is 
important to note the present situation of the first generation. The difficulties in integration into 
the host country and the subsequent attempts to idealize the home country among first generation 
immigrants are widely observed phenomena. For instance, Lowenthal claims: “immigrants cut 
off from their roots remain dislocated; discontinuity impels many… to exaggerate attachments to 
romanticized homeland or stridently to assert an adoptive belonging”58. In the case of the 
displaced Sri Lankan Tamils, this phenomenon is more acute given their attachment to their land. 
For instance, Valentine Daniel, who has conducted extensive research on Tamils in Sri Lanka 
and in the diaspora, says that the Sri Lankan Tamil’s attachment to land is inalienable59. The 
Tamil Ur, translated as village, is more than just a place, but a place from which the inhabitants 
draw the metaphysical substance of their very being60. According to Daniel, “when a Tamil loses 
                                                 
55 Litvak Palestinian Collective Memory, 13. 
56 Lowenthal, Past is a Foreign Country, XVI. 
57 Here I use Dhooleka Raj’s observations about Hindu Panjabi refugees in New Delhi  
58 Lowenthal, Past is a Foreign Country, 42. 
59 E. Valentine Daniel, The Lost Ur, in Village Matters: Relocating villages in the contemporary Anthropology of 
India edited by Diane P. Mines and Nicolas Yazgi (Oxford: University of  Oxford Press, 2010), 325 
60 Ibid., 236. 
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her ur… she loses her world, which was for her the world, and is then forced into a quest for 
authenticity in a strange space out of place61.” He further notes that the “Sri Lankan Tamil 
refugees and immigrants in Toronto, if at all possible, like to reproduce a simulacrum” of their 
village in Toronto by settling in a “neighborhood with people from their own ur62.” 
Moreover, the Sri Lankan Tamil situation is marked by an extreme rupture of the social 
fabric and a displacement that is perhaps only surpassed proportionally by the case of Palestinian 
refugees. For instance, in the 1981 census there were 1,714,000 Sri Lankan Tamils. By 2000, 
more than a third had emigrated out of Sri Lanka and another third had been internally 
displaced63. The overall proportion of the Sri Lankan Tamil population in the island had also 
been reduced to 4.3% from 12.7%64. 
It is in light of this rapid transformation, weakened social patterns and social upheaval that 
the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils’ recollections in Toronto should be understood. For 
instance, Eric Hobsbawm notes that often the remembrance of the past is particularly rooted in 
the core values of the “old tradition65.” For Sri Lankan Tamils, the core of their social values and 
system of social interaction was land. Moreover, the Sri Lankan Tamil society was land-centered 
in more ways than one, but most importantly, social status was “land-bound66”, which was most 
visibly manifested in owning a house. A large house meant a higher social status. In other words, 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 331. 
62 Ibid., 329-30. 
63 International Displacement Monitoring Center, Norwegian Refugee Council, “Sri Lanka: Continuing 
Humanitarian Concerns and Obstacles to Durable Solutions for Recent and Longer-term IDPs,” November 10, 2009. 
64 Sri Lanka Census Reports 1981, 2001. 
65 Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition, ed., Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 4. 
66 Daniel Charred Lullabies, 175. 
  Land was at the center of Sri Lankan Tamil identity in the island as Daniel explains. I will discuss this phenomenon 
at length in the Third Chapter. 
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attachment to land and the social fabric based on land were essential to the first generation Sri 
Lankan Tamil’s sense of identity67. 
It is in attempting to cope with the powerful psychological rupture resulting from 
displacement that “Golden Eelam” emerges. In other words, Golden Eelam is similar to the 
concept of “lost paradise,” romanticized and “nostalgically reconstructed” by many a diaspora68. 
Nostalgia and reconstruction in this context are noteworthy because nostalgia points to the past 
while reconstruction points to the present; the two are bridged by the lost paradise or Golden 
Eelam69. The large houses, therefore, serves as a bridge between the social statuses enjoyed in 
Sri Lanka and their new social position in Canada. As such, the remembrance of large houses, 
which is a sign of wealth and higher social status in Sri Lanka reflect the first generation’s 
attempt to hold on and continue the core values of the Sri Lankan Tamil society in Sri Lanka. 
This was forcefully evident in their keeping of the deeds to their houses back in Sri Lanka. 
Several first generation Sri Lankan Tamils I interviewed admitted to keeping the deeds of the 
houses they abandoned due to civil war. 
However, the anxieties and the social ruptures of the first generation that manifested in their 
recollection of Eelam are not passed on to the second generation in their entirety. Instead, the 
second generation possesses a “received memory70” of Eelam, a state of seeing-without-seeing. 
Received memory need be neither logical nor complete although this illogicality and 
                                                 
67 The earliest to leave Sri Lanka were almost all from the middle class in Jaffna. And the Jaffna middle class were 
comparatively materially better off than their southern counterparts for historical and cultural reasons, especially the 
cultivation of thrift as a virtue by the community. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that many of these middle class 
asylum seekers did live in large houses and owned land. 
68 O’Reilly Cuba, 179 and 181. 
69 Nostalgia, according to the psychoanalytic theory, arises from the refusal to acknowledge the past, to mourn it and 
to let it go. Nostalgic remembrance does not necessarily mean false remembrance, but rather remembrance anchored 
in the past and refusal to move on (conversation with professor Valentine Daniel). 
70 O’Reilly Cuba, 179. 
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incompleteness is not always intentional. Instead, its function is to pass on a value or an idea 
rather than a concrete set of facts. In my interviews with second generation Sri Lankan Tamils, 
this phenomenon was evident as they remembered the idea of the large house without 
remembering or knowing the physical details of the houses. 
One of the most frequent responses from second generation Sri Lankan Tamils to the 
question – "Do you know where in Sri Lanka you are originally from?" – was that their parents 
and grandparents lived in large houses. Most of them knew the region (Jaffna or Batticaloa, for 
instance) and sometimes the specific village their parents used to live in. However, when asked 
exactly how large their houses were, most did not remember or know the details. The idea of the 
large house was more important than the actual physical house. For instance, Gnanan, a twenty-
five year old Sri Lankan Tamil who had left Sri Lanka when he was two years old said: “You 
mean how many bedrooms? I don’t know. We have three bedrooms here (meaning the house in 
Toronto), so more than three bedrooms I guess.” Another twenty-two year old, Veeran, said: 
“My father’s house had separate quarters for servants because a family was serving us. They 
were with us for two generations.” While Veeran did not know the whereabouts or the name of 
the family, his suggestion was straightforward. His family had been wealthy and lived in a house 
large enough to require the services of an entire family of servants. 
Overtime the physical distance experienced by the first generation vis-à-vis Eelam was 
augmented by a temporal distance confronting the second generation. This is especially true 
when the second generation has not visited the country of their parents. Lowenthal claims that 
this temporal distance “…purges the past of personal attachments and makes it an object of 
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universal veneration, lending the remote a majesty and dignity absent from the homely…71.” In 
other words, it is not the actual physical house that is important, but the idea of a large house; the 
social values of majesty and dignity conveyed by a large house are more important than the 
personal memories and values attached to a large house. 
 
Ethic of Hard Work and Industry 
If the first generation recollection of large houses provides a bridge to the past for the 
second generation, the ethic of hard work provides a bridge to the future. More importantly, it 
provides a system of values in which the dignified past, manifested in recollections of large 
houses, could be recreated and maintained. For the first generation, the hard work ethic was part 
of the idealized Golden Eelam, and similar to the large houses, related to land further indicating 
their attachment to land. In Toronto, the first generation repeatedly recounted a general story 
which embodied the work ethic of the Sri Lankan Tamil. Upon finding out that I was a Sinhalese 
from Colombo, a typical conversation about the work ethic would follow a similar pattern: “You 
know in the south, all you have to do is throw the seeds on the ground and nature takes care of 
the rest. But in Jaffna, it is nearly impossible to perform agriculture. But who do you think sends 
chili to Colombo72?” 
The chilies were sometimes substituted with tobacco, but the moral of the story remained 
the same. The Sinhalese in the South, with all the natural advantages incumbent to the South's 
geography still could not match the agricultural prowess of Sri Lankan Tamils in the North, who 
                                                 
71 Lowenthal Past is a Foreign Country, 53. 
72 The south-west largely inhabited by the Sinhalese is the most fertile “Wet-Zone” of the island while the Jaffna 
peninsula is in the “Dry-Zone.” The lack of rainfall in the north makes irrigation a necessity while plentiful rainfall 
in the south makes irrigation redundant.  
 In the 1970s chili from Jaffna was very popular in Colombo and the reference to chili may also be seen as 
remembrance of a more prosperous time in Eelam. Since the late 1980s, agriculture in Jaffna has virtually collapsed.  
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faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the successful implementation of agriculture. The 
story, while not told in Sri Lanka, nevertheless refers to two internalized stereotypes among Sri 
Lankans, both Tamils and Sinhalese: that the Sri Lankan Tamils are industrious, crafty, smart 
and hard working, and that the Sinhalese are naïve, laid back and indolent. 
It is noteworthy that the popular story in Toronto relates to agriculture and land, while in Sri 
Lanka the industry and intelligence of the Sri Lankan Tamil is usually mentioned with reference 
to education and white collar professions. Sri Lankan Tamils in Colombo own houses rather than 
large plots of land. Therefore, the measure of their success lies in education and in financial 
enterprises. Even in Toronto, the Sinhalese still mention the Sri Lankan Tamils’ ethic of hard 
work which allows them to find high-paying professional jobs. This belief is also internalized by 
the second generation Sinhalese in Toronto who continue to view their second generation Tamil 
counterparts as generally “smart.”  It is only among the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils that 
the reference to agriculture and land emerges, another indication of their land-bound, 
romanticized remembrance. 
Similar to the received memory of large houses, the second generation has again 
internalized the value rather than the subject. The ethic of hard work is internalized and applied 
to education and employment rather than to the subject of the story – agriculture73. While I could 
not verify the second generation’s educational or professional achievements, their success in 
both school and the workplace was widely stereotyped in Toronto by all ethnic groups. Perhaps a 
more concrete indication of their success may be the steady movement of Sri Lankan Tamils, 
                                                 
73 While this may seem obvious in the post-industrial society in Canada, agriculture is still practiced widely among 
the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada, albeit in a token scale. Many Sri Lankan Tamils had small 
vegetable gardens. Those who did not have large enough yards grew Tomatoes in large clay pots. Tomatoes were by 
and large the most popular to grow. Most complained of the severe weather conditions in Canada and explained how 
they had to work around the unforgiving weather conditions in Canada.  
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largely led by the second generation, from predominantly ethnic neighborhoods in Scarborough 
to mostly middle class neighborhoods such as Markham. The Sri Lankan Tamil movement to 
middle class neighborhoods that began in the last decade is for most part led by the second 
generation74. 
The first generation’s remembering has influenced the way the second generation perceives 
Eelam as well as the way they relate to their conditions in Toronto. In large part, the recollection 
of large houses has given them a sense of social worth and status that legitimizes their middle 
class claims in Canada. On the other hand, the ethic of hard work, in which they take much pride, 
has allowed them the means to reclaim the past. More importantly, it has also allowed the second 
generation to relate to Eelam in a way that emphasizes its prosperity, remembering the beauty 
and forgetting the ugly. In this way, the first generation’s attempt to hold on to their core values 
in the “shifting sands of nostalgia and memory” has translated into the second generation’s 
memory, albeit received memory, of larger-than-life prosperity. Furthermore, their memory of 
Golden Eelam is continuously reinforced the LTTE. For instance, a personal narrative from a Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugee appearing in the Tamil Guardian read: 
It all began in 1983 for me following the horrifying experience of the riots…I soon 
forgot and overcame the bad memories thanks to my people and Jaffna. I was just a 
little girl and I was swept away by the simple beauty of my hometown 
Chavakachchery – the lush paddy fields, the tall palmyrahs, the mango groves and 
the hot white sand that made me hop and jump when I tried walking to the kovil 
close by. Jaffna healed me and my horrific memories of riots…Jaffna saved me in 
many ways. Jaffna taught me culture, the beauty in living close to nature, the 
                                                 
74 Sean Durak, “Newcomers Find a Home in Scarborough,” Inside Toronto,  March 30, 2003. 
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importance of an ecologically sustainable living and embedded in me deep spiritual 
beliefs75. 
 
Another article appearing a fortnight later said: 
Imagine a country whose greatest asset is its people. A country in which over a third 
of its citizens speak fluently one or more of English, French, German, Spanish, 
Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, Dutch, Creole, Zulu and many more, in addition to 
speaking the world’s oldest living classical language, Tamil. A country with one of 
the highest literacy rates in the world, which has for decades exported professionals 
– doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers, accountants, computer programmers – as 
far afield as Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, much of Africa…Imagine 
a country whose unpolluted seas are a clear turquoise blue, lined with white sandy 
beaches, still unspoilt, whose skies take on the azure hues of the Indian sub 
continent, whose shore is lined with coconut palms, and tens of varieties of mango, 
guava and jack fruit. Imagine a country of rice fields and banana groves, chili plants 
and hibiscus flowers, brimming with the lushness of the tropics, which even in places 
which are not naturally green has been made so by the industriousness of its people, 
its network of traditional water wells and irrigation channels. You remember this 
county. It is Eelam76. 
 
The references to land, hard work, education and industry are obvious. The overall memory 
of Eelam is that of a lush, prosperous and wealthy “country” inhabited by a spiritually elevated, 
highly literate, multilingual, industrious and professionally thriving Sri Lankan Tamil people.  
 
                                                 
75 Janani Barath, “What can we do? Thoughts for the Tamil Diaspora,” Tamil Guardian, no: 366, February 06, 2008. 
76 T. J. Janani, “Because we Can,” Tamil Guardian, No. 367, February 20, 2008. 
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Chapter 3            Forgetting Differences 
“Remembering is a malady for which forgetting is the cure
77
” – George Perec 
 
Forgetting  
Forgetting as a human phenomenon has been studied for centuries. However, a specific 
social focus on diasporic forgetting only gained academic attention after the Second World War. 
Until recently, the Euro-centric Aristotelian and Freudian traditions of loss of memory imprints 
dominated the study of forgetting78. However, I use the recent, non Euro-centric, tradition of 
studying forgetting as a cultural phenomenon in which the dichotomy between the private and 
public spheres is stressed79. Forgetting connotes agency on the part of the individual as opposed 
to amnesia, which is inadvertent. Furthermore, forgetting is often manifested in disregarding 
certain information rather than entirely erasing information from memory. It is in forgetting as an 
act of disregarding that the dichotomy between the private and the public becomes significant. 
One is able to forget in public by disregarding information, while still remembering that same 
information in private.    
I argue in this chapter that selective forgetting among the first generation Sri Lankan Tamils 
in Toronto has led to a sense of universal brotherhood among the second generation. In the 
public sphere, the forgetting has largely occurred in the context of the development of a master 
narrative for Sri Lankan Tamils by the LTTE, which I discuss in Chapter Four. Over time, the 
historical discourse in the public sphere in Toronto largely coalesced around the master narrative 
as the first generation selectively forgot information that contradicted the master narrative. 
                                                 
77 George Perec quoted in Adrian Forty and Susane Kuchler, ed., The Art of Forgetting (New York: Berg, 1999), 1. 
78 Ibid., 6. 
79 Winter and Sivan, War and Remembrance, 183. 
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I focus on the public sphere because I could not conduct research on the private sphere 
which would entail interviewing large numbers of Sri Lankan Tamils, both first generation and 
second generation. Instead, I explore forgetting through the first generation’s selective 
disregarding of differences among Tamils in Sri Lanka so as to largely conform to the master 
narrative imposed by the LTTE in which all differences among Tamils in Sri Lanka are subdued 
in favor of a monolithic identity. I explore the differences that existed among the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka by focusing on one difference based on regional identity and another based on caste. 
 
Regional Differences 
Different identities based on regional differences have traditionally been the most salient of 
differences among the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Tamils were largely differentiated based on three 
regions – Jaffna, Batticaloa and the Hill Country. Although Colombo is home to a significant 
Tamil population, it is generally not considered a basis for a differentiated identity as most 
Tamils living in Colombo trace their ancestry to the three regions of Jaffna, Batticaloa and the 
Hill Country. Jaffna to the North and Batticaloa to the East were mainly home to Sri Lankan 
Tamils or Tamils who had lived in the island before the arrival of South Indian Tamil laborers in 
the mid nineteenth century. The South Indian Tamil laborers, brought to the island to work on 
the coffee, rubber and tea plantations, are concentrated in the central hill regions of the island 
and are popularly called Estate Tamils or Indian Tamils.  
Valentine Daniel says that “Sri Lankans have forgotten that there was a time when where 
you lived mattered more than your language or religion80." Indeed, regional identity subsumed 
social, religious and linguistic differences among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. It is important to note 
                                                 
80 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 16. 
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that the Tamils of Sri Lanka were still very much aware of the differences among them until the 
1980s when the civil war erupted in full force. The Sinhalese, on the other hand, had largely 
overcome their once-considerable differences much earlier81. 
 
Sri Lankan Tamil (Blue) and Indian Tamil (Pink) percentages in each of the districts. The italics refer to the census 
data from 1981. No census has been held in the six districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Killinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa since. (Sri Lanka Census Report, 2001) 
 
The differences in language were one of the most salient of all differences among Tamils 
and were based on the dialects spoken in the three main regions mentioned above and the values 
attached to them. The Jaffna Tamil dialect is considered centamir (elegant or pure) and thus 
more prestigious than the Indian Tamil dialect, which is considered kotuntamir (coarse or corrupt 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 17. 
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Tamil) by the Jaffna Tamils82. In fact there are a several openly derogatory names for Indian 
Tamils in popular Tamil culture in Jaffna. The most widely used is Kallattoni (illicit boat person) 
while tottakkattan (plantation jungle man) is used less widely83. The Indian Tamils, for their part, 
call Sri Lankan Tamils, whether from Jaffna or elsewhere, panankottai cuppis (suckers of 
Palmyra seeds), a derogatory epithet84. 
  Furthermore, the differences went far beyond mere making fun of each other’s spoken 
dialect. The values attached to language, as indicated by preoccupation with prestige and purity 
reveal underlying social differences. For instance, Daniel, writing about the period before the 
1990s says that “the contempt shown toward these hill-country Tamils by the Jaffna Tamils and 
the incorrigible distrust that the former have towards the latter was too well known among both 
groups to even require mention85.” Even fairly mundane activities such as cooking and eating 
have had powerful impacts on the differences. For instance, Indian Tamils use very different 
spices in cooking than Sri Lankan Tamils, who use spices similar to the ones used by the 
Sinhalese.  Both groups deride each other’s use of spices as less sophisticated than their own. 
The Indian Tamils use more milk in cooking but less chili and coconut while the Sri Lankan 
Tamils use less milk but more chili and coconut in cooking86. 
A more marked difference between Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils is the method of eating. 
Sri Lankans, both Sinhalese and Tamil, similar to their neighbors in India, use their hands (right 
or left hand) to eat. The hand movements and placements are considered of utmost importance 
and eating rice, the staple for both Sinhalese and Tamils, in social situations is usually an 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 29. 
83 Ibid., 21. 
84 Ibid., 18. 
85 Ibid., 18. 
86 Karthigesu Sivathamby, Sri Lankan Tamil Society and Politics, 8th World Tamil Conference Special Publication 
(Madras: New Century Book House, 1995), 4. 
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elaborate affair concerned with grace of movement. In fact, Sri Lankans can generally gauge 
another Sri Lankan’s social background by merely observing the manner in which they use their 
hands to eat rice. Children, both Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamil, are trained from early age to 
keep the rice-line well above the base of the fingers and to keep the other hand on the table 
across the body between the body and the plate. Indian Tamils,  on the other hand, use the entire 
hand including the palms to mix and eat rice and place equal importance to form and hand 
movements, albeit drastically different from those of Sri Lankan Tamils87. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that both groups abhor each other’s manner of eating and deride other’s manners as 
unsophisticated and even disgusting88. 
Another major difference among the Sri Lankan Tamils concerns genealogy. The patrilineal 
Jaffna Tamils of the North had a starkly different social structure than the matrilineal Batticaloa 
Tamils of the East89. In fact, the Sri Lankan Tamils from Jaffna and Batticaloa were loath to 
marry each other because of the differences in family structures between the people of the two 
regions. The social organization of Batticaloa Tamils, excepting the Vellalah caste, is based on 
the Kuti90 system, the exogamous matri-clans, in which no male carries with him the kuti of his 
birth and always joins his wife’s kuti on marriage91. Moreover, the husband always moves to the 
                                                 
87 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 165. 
88 Originally, the flat plates used by Indian Tamils (same as in South India) required them to use their whole palm in 
sweeping motions around the plate to keep the gravy on the plate. However, now flat plates are almost never used in 
Sri Lanka among the Indian Tamils. But the customs, mannerisms and movements remain the same. They serve a 
purely social purpose and illustrate how important this seemingly trivial activity is among Tamils in Sri Lanka.  
89 Dennis McGilvray in Ethnigraphy of Fertility and Birth, edited by Carol P. MacCormack (Prospect Heights, 
Illinois: Waveland, 1994), 16-7. 
90 In Tamil, means settlement or house. Alternatively spelled Kudi. 
91 Sivathamby, Sri Lankan Tamil Society and Politics, 9. 
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wife’s house and their children become part of the larger family of the wife, but not the 
husband’s, a practice anathema to the highly patrilineal Jaffna Tamils92. 
 
Caste Differences 
The differences in family and social structures among the Tamils point to another significant 
difference – caste – among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Tamils of the North and the 
East are as caste conscious as the Tamils of South India, but have for centuries had a set of castes 
with somewhat different names, functions and positions in the hierarchy than those that may be 
found in South India. The number of castes among the Indian Tamils who work in the 
plantations of Sri Lanka, however, are far fewer than those that are to be found either in their 
ancestral South India or among the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Indian Tamils also have somewhat 
different nomenclature than the Sri Lankan Tamils and are much less fastidious about caste than 
the Sri Lankan Tamils93. This is partly due to the fact that there are numerically very few 
individuals among these plantation workers who belong to the upper castes, who are the ones 
who are generally given to orthodoxy in the caste system. In Sri Lanka, the caste system is most 
rigid among the Jaffna Tamils and less so among the Batticaloa Tamils94. For instance, until 
recently, a Tamil Vellalah (the “highest” Tamil caste in Sri Lanka) would rather have his 
daughter marry a Sinhala Goyigama (the corresponding “highest” caste among Sinhalese) than 
have her marry a Tamil of a “lower” caste95. 
                                                 
92 Nur Yalman, Under the Bo Tree: Studies in Caste, Kinship, and Marriage in the Interior of Ceylon (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1967), 286-7. 
93 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 175. 
 The most distinct characteristic is that among the Sri Lankan Tamils, the highest caste is the non-Brahmin Vellala 
caste, which dominates the priestly Brahmin caste, while the Brahmin caste is at the pinnacle in India.  
94 Yalman, Under the Bo Tree, 329. 
95 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 16. 
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Similarly in 1912, the Sri Lankans elected Ponnambalam Ramanathan, a Tamil, to the only 
local seat in the colonial assembly over Dr. Hilarion Marcus Fernando, a Sinhalese. At the time, 
out of a population of about 4.5 million, fewer than three thousand could vote in the election. 
Ramanathan won 1645 to 981. Therefore, even if all the Tamils had voted for Ramanathan, at 
least a quarter of the Sinhalese must have voted for Ramanathan over Dr. Fernando as well. The 
election is widely held as an example of caste collaboration across ethnic boundaries in Sri 
Lanka. Dr. Fernando was from the Sinhalese Karava caste, which was considered lesser than the 
dominant Goyigama caste among the Sinhalese or the Vellalah among the Tamils, to which 
Ramanathan belonged. Since most of the elite with voting rights at the time were either 
Goyigama or Vellalah, it was believed that the voters would have preferred a Tamil from a 
higher caste than a Sinhalese from a lower caste96. 
The importance of caste among the Sri Lankan Tamils was such that even in the immediate 
aftermath of Black July in 1983, the caste differences were not forgotten. According to Daniel, 
immediately after the events during Black July, packets of food were donated to the refugee 
camps by foreign embassies in Sri Lanka. Soon after the food arrived in the camps, the higher 
caste Tamils ordered that the food be taken “upstairs” to where they were housed and sent 
“down” the leftovers once they were done97. 
Daniel notes cases of caste consciousness in other parts of Sri Lanka and South India as 
well. He notes that some of the Sri Lankan Tamils from the East, fleeing Sinhalese mobs in 
1983, were given water in coconut shells by the Northern higher caste Tamils for fear that their 
                                                 
96 Peebles, History of Sri Lanka, 79. 
 There were many instances in which, the two higher castes among the Sinhalese and the Tamils collaborated to 
protect their interests. Accordingly, all the political leaders of colonial and independent Sri Lanka, both Sinhalese 
and Tamil were from the two “highest” castes until the outbreak of the civil war in 1980s. 
97 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 162. 
46 
 
lips would pollute the cups of the higher caste Tamils98. In another instance, when asked by her 
teacher whether she was a “repatriate Tamil99,” a refugee Jaffna Tamil girl living in South India 
replied “chee” (meaning eww or gross in Sri Lanka). 
The episodes mentioned above are particularly illuminating in the context in which they 
occurred. The Tamils of Sri Lanka had just witnessed a mass killing of Tamils and the 
destruction of Tamil property by Sinhalese mobs. Those in refugee camps had only narrowly 
escaped certain death and most had seen or heard of a murder of another Tamil family member, 
friend or neighbor. Nevertheless, even in those dire situations, the caste distinctions were strictly 
maintained and adhered to by many Vellalahs among the Sri Lankan Tamils100.  
 
The Muslims 
The Muslims of Sri Lanka are broadly categorized as Sri Lankan Moors, Malays, and Indian 
Muslims. Sri Lankan Moors comprise more than 93% of Muslim population and are the 
descendents of Arab settlers in the island since the fourteenth century. Indian Muslims refer to a 
myriad number of small Muslim groups such as Memons101. However, for the Muslims, their 
religious identity is stronger than any ethnic identity. As such “Muslim” today is used alongside 
Sri Lankan Tamil and Sinhalese as a distinct group. Out of the Muslims, who are spread across 
four corners of Sri Lanka, of particular interest to the thesis are the largely Sri Lankan Moor 
Muslims who live in the regions demanded by the LTTE. 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 162. 
99 Repatriate Tamil, in South India meant an Indian Tamil who was repatriated to India after Sri Lankan 
independence. 
100  Since the civil war, no reliable studies have been carried out to research social differences among Tamils of Sri 
Lanka. 




In the North, the Tamils and Muslims 
had lived for centuries as neighbors and in 
peace. However, since 1990, the Muslims in 
the LTTE regions, as a minority-within-a-
minority, were increasingly oppressed by the 
LTTE102. In the East, where they hold the 
balance in ethnic power struggles between the 
Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, the 
Muslims are “caught in the crossfire103” 
between the two warring communities. The 
Muslims became the targets of LTTE attacks 
as the Indian Peace Keeping Force was 
planning its withdrawal from Sri Lanka in late 1990. Of the string of massacres of Muslims in 
the East, in which more than a thousand Muslims were killed in a few months104, Kattankudi 
mosque massacre is the best known, in which LTTE gunmen killed 147 Muslim men in four 
mosques in Kattankudi region in August 1990105. Soon thereafter, the LTTE moved to expel the 
Muslims from the North. “Without any warning, in the third week of October 1990, LTTE cadres 
went from village to village in the Northern Province, announcing over loudspeakers that 
Muslims had forty-eight hours to leave LTTE-held territory or face reprisals. In Jaffna Muslims 
                                                 
102  V. Suryanarayan, “Singing the Same Tune,” Frontline Volume 19 - Issue 09, Apr. 27 - May 10, 2002. 
103  Asia Report, Sri Lanka Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, N’134 – 29th May 2007. 
 The ethnic balance in the east is about equal with Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims comprising about a 
third of the population each. 
104  Ibid. 




were given only two hours to leave and permitted to take just 150 Rupees ($1.40) with them. In 
other areas, they fled with just their clothes and little money106.”  
In the aftermath of the massacres and the expulsions, thousands of Muslims were killed and 
an estimated 75,000 Muslims were forced out of LTTE-held regions107. In Jaffna Peninsula 
alone, the Muslims were said to have left behind as much as 5,000 million Rupees ($46 million) 
in valuables and property108 while in the east, the Muslims were said to have abandoned, under 
force of arms, more than 63,000 acres of land109. In 1990, the LTTE categorically expelled the 
Muslims not only from the regions under its control, but also from the Eelam project, a cause in 
which many young Muslim men had enlisted. The expulsions, however, convinced the Muslims 
that their destiny lay elsewhere. As such, the relations between the two communities in the east 
are characterized by deep and mutual distrust110. 
 
Second Generation Brotherhood 
However, these differences are remarkably absent among the second generation Sri Lankan 
Tamils in Toronto. Not a single second generation Sri Lankan Tamil knew about the regional 
basis for differences even though they knew the regional affixes to Sri Lankan Tamils. While 
most knew the caste of their parents and therefore their own caste, they did not know the 
hierarchy nor how to gauge the caste of other Sri Lankan Tamils, which is usually indicated by 
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107  Ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
109 Amnesty International , “Sri Lanka – the North East: Human Rights Violations in a context of Armed Conflict.” 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=5E7F89A231872062802569A600601598  
110  To be sure, the Sinhalese have treated the Muslims no better albeit with no planned expulsions. The precarious 
ethnic balance in the east made the province the most unstable region in Sri Lanka. Since the beginning of the civil 
war, all three major peace attempts have failed due to incidents in the east. The Sri Lankan government is also 
suspected of arming and training Muslims groups in the East, ostensibly for their self-defense, but with the larger 
goal of destabilizing ethnic relations between the Muslim and Sri Lankan Tamil communities in the Province. 
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the names. Three mentioned that they faced pressure from their parents to marry within their own 
caste, Vellalah, and noted that they were largely oblivious to caste distinctions until the issue of 
marriage arose. 
Only six out of the thirty-four I interviewed even knew about the Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. Twenty-one out of the thirty-four knew that South Indian Tamils were brought to the 
island during the nineteenth century by the British to work the plantations. However, they did not 
know that the Indian Tamils consisted of a distinct group of Tamils. In fact, the Indian Tamils 
are known among the second generation as “Up Country Tamils” or “Central Highlands Tamils” 
similar to the usual Eastern or Batticaloa Tamils and Northern or Jaffna Tamils that explicitly 
refer to geography. However, the values attached to the regions among the first generation Sri 
Lankan Tamil are entirely absent in the second generation, who relate to regional distinctions as 
purely an accident of birth defined by administrative convenience rather than as a basis for 
separate identities. 
On a lighter note, Ramanan, a twenty-six year old who had immigrated to Canada at four, 
was the only person to mention Kallattoni, although he used it to mean “fresh off the boat” to 
Canada rather than as a derogatory epithet toward Indian Tamils. Ramanan further joked about 
the Upcountry Tamils and compared them to the Guyanese in Canada. The popular joke about 
the Indo-Guyanese in Toronto, he said, was that their ancestors were slow on their feet which 
allowed the British to catch them in India and send them to British Guyana. Maybe the 
Upcountry Tamils in Sri Lanka, he said, too must have been slow runners. 
It was evident that the second generation had no sense of the differences that existed among 
their parents in Sri Lanka and that the first generation had largely forgotten about the differences 
at least in the public sphere. Nevertheless, my interviews with second generation Sri Lankan 
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Tamils suggested that the first generation was still conscious of differences in private, 
particularly caste and regional differences, without explicitly passing it on to the second 
generation. For instance, Kathy, a twenty-four year old, mentioned an “incident” that occurred 
on the beaches of Lake Ontario in Toronto. She and her sister were verbally harassed by a group 
of Sri Lankan Tamil boys who were also at the beach with their parents. When she expressed her 
amazement at the boys’ lewd behavior in front of their own parents and the parents’ inaction, her 
mother quipped that they were “coastal dwellers” in Sri Lanka and did not know any better. 
While Kathy still did not fully comprehend the meaning of her mother’s remark at the time of the 
interview, she knew that there was a difference between those who lived inland and those who 
lived on the coasts, the latter belonging to the Karayar or fisher caste. 
In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Karayar caste, which is considered second only to Vellalah, was 
largely concentrated in the coasts as they were fishermen by occupation as opposed to the 
Vellalah who were farmers or landowners. The two castes have maintained a distance between 
themselves throughout history with each considering the other “arrogant.” The early Sri Lankan 
Tamil leaders and politicians were all from the Vellalah caste while the LTTE leadership is from 
the Karayar caste111. Therefore, in Sri Lanka the leadership of the Sri Lankan Tamils has passed 
from the Vellalah to the Karayar. Kathy probably belonged to Vellalah caste even though she 
was not aware of her caste. For instance, Daniel mentions that an entire generation of Vellalah 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Jaffna loathed being ruled by lower caste Karayar than by the Sinhalese112. 
Tyranny of the Sinhalese was more dignified than rule by lower caste Tamils. 
Another twenty year old Sri Lankan Tamil, Amaran, mentioned that during the New Year 
celebrations, his parents would immediately discard the food received from some Sri Lankan 
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Tamil neighbors in Scarborough. The Tamil New Year falls in mid April and it is custom to 
exchange platters of food among the neighbors and extended family as tokens of goodwill. The 
caste hierarchy in Sri Lanka prevented lower caste neighbors from exchanging food with their 
higher caste neighbors, who were afraid of the “pollution” transmitted by the lower castes. Now 
in Toronto, the higher castes seem to accept the food at the door in public while quickly 
discarding the food in private soon afterwards. The two examples mentioned above illustrate the 
dichotomy that exists between the private and the public sphere among the first generation Sri 
Lankan Tamils in Toronto. In the public sphere they have forgotten the differences that existed 
back home, but still remember them in private. 
Surprisingly, the Muslims seemed to be almost an afterthought to the second generation Sri 
Lankan Tamils. While thirty-one out of the thirty-four I interviewed knew about the Muslims in 
the East, only six knew about the expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province in 1990; 
none knew about the extent and the brutality of the expulsion. In fact, many were surprised at my 
questions about the Tamil speaking Muslims because they did not know that the Muslims “were 
an issue.” For the second generation, the Muslims in the east were equally discriminated against 
by the Sinhalese as the Sri Lankan Tamils and as such were thought to be firmly within the fold 
of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. 
 
Turmoil and Egalitarian Pressures 
One of the major reasons for the first generation’s forgetting is that during the time of their 
immigration to Toronto, Tamil society in Sri Lanka was in turmoil and thus Tamil social 
identities in a state of flux. An overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada 
immigrated in the decade of 1986 to 1995. Through research conducted precisely during this 
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period, Daniel notes that some social boundaries within Tamil society in Sri Lanka were being 
redrawn and that some were erased all together113. Linguistic, regional, caste and religious 
boundaries were being redrawn under the new circumstances brought about by the civil war. 
The foremost reason for the state of flux in social identities was the large scale displacement 
caused by the civil war during this period and the subsequent broken residential patterns. This is 
particularly acute for a society that based its identity on land. Similarly, the same phenomenon is 
observed among other land-bound groups experiencing massive displacement. The most widely 
studied is the case of the Palestinians. The Palestinian society soon after the Nakba was in a state 
of flux as its land-bound social structure was ruptured by massive displacement and proved 
inadequate to maintain social relations in displacement114. The same phenomenon is also 
observed among the Cuban exiles, who did not have a rigid land-bound social structure, to a 
lesser degree115. 
Another powerful impetus for forgetting among the first generation may be the egalitarian 
pressures they faced in Canada. Moving from a highly hierarchical society in Sri Lanka to an 
egalitarian society in Toronto, the first generation was pressured, albeit indirectly, by both their 
Canadian neighbors and their own children inculcated in Canadian values of equality. For 
instance, criticizing the official Canadian policy of multiculturalism, Neil Bissoondath, says that 
the emphasis on “home cultures” has led to ethnic stereotyping in which the complex home 
identities of the immigrants are disregarded in favor of a “usable” ethnic identity in the new host 
context of Canada116. Terence Turner agrees that multiculturalism in Canada “risks reifying 
cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it 
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risks overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures…117” Another impetus for forgetting 
comes directly from the first generation’s younger kin, thoroughly inculcated in Western values 
of equality. For instance, Daniel mentions an episode in which an aunt visiting the United States 
complained to her nephew in the diaspora about the corpse of a young man belonging to a lower 
caste who was killed by the army. The nephew remarked to Daniel: “These people (the likes of 
his aunt) should be lined up and shot118.”  
Regardless of the reasons for first generation’s selective forgetting, the second generation 
has a universal and highly inclusive sense of Sri Lankan Tamil identity that was not observed 
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Chapter 4       The Master Narrative: Ignorance and the LTTE 
“To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’… It 
means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger
119
”- Walter Benjamin 
 
Ignorance 
Unlike memory and forgetting, ignorance, as a social phenomenon has not been widely 
theorized and scholars have not largely distinguished between forgetting and ignorance120. 
However, as noted by Gershon and Raj, forgetting is a voluntary act done principally by first 
generation migrants, while ignorance is the involuntary consequence manifested primarily in 
second generation migrants121. Furthermore, ignorance does not necessarily arise from the 
negative, forgetting, but also from the positive122 larger-than-life remembrance. In this chapter, 
ignorance, manifested in the second generation, is discussed as a consequence of the sum of 
remembrance and forgetting discussed in the previous two chapters. 
As with remembrance, ignorance is not individual in character, but is “socially-bounded123” 
because it exists in a social framework which is determined outside the individual. However, in 
contrast to remembrance and forgetting, ignorance occupies the space, the gap, left by larger-
than-life remembrance and selective forgetting. I do not employ the word ignorance pejoratively, 
rather as a purely structural phenomenon and an analytical tool without a value judgment. I also 
use ignorance and unawareness interchangeably for clarity. 
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In a second generation diaspora, lacking the experience of the home country, the social 
framework becomes even more significant. It is here that the LTTE’s role in the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diaspora becomes paramount. By indoctrination, intimidation, extortion and sometimes 
even murder124, the LTTE managed to set the boundaries of discussion within the diaspora, 
particularly in Toronto. As a result, the LTTE came to monopolize the public discourse in 
Toronto and by the turn of the century, managed to establish its own version of historical 
narrative as representative of all Sri Lankan Tamils, violently impeding sustained discussions to 
the contrary. The master narrative of the LTTE provided the social framework, the imposition of 
which was facilitated by the ignorance among the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils in the 
diaspora. Before the master narrative is discussed, the organizational strength of the LTTE and 
its reach among the diaspora in Toronto should be discussed in order to better understand the 
imposition of the master narrative. 
 
Profiling Tigers 
As a terrorist organization, the LTTE, popularly known in Toronto as the Tigers, has an 
impressive resume. Indeed, the LTTE was the only terrorist organization in the world capable of 
conventional warfare with heavy weapons, artillery and tanks. However, its most devastating 
invention was the modern suicide belt and jacket. Having pioneered the human bomb in its 
modern form125, the LTTE was responsible for 40% of the 186 suicide attacks in the world from 
1980 to 2001126. Moreover, it was deadlier than any other terrorist organization including Hamas 
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and Hizballah during the same period, responsible for 48.6% of all deaths from suicide bombings 
in the world127. The LTTE’s most notorious achievement was to assassinate two world leaders – 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka – in 
suicide attacks, the only organization in the world to assassinate two leaders of state128. 
Furthermore, its military capabilities were unique and legendary among the terrorist 
organizations with a fully operational Navy and even a rudimentary Air Force, both with suicide 
wings129 and large female contingents within the ranks. The LTTE was also the only terrorist 
organization to own a commercial carrier sea fleet, which was used to smuggle weapons and 
other goods across the Indian Ocean130. In addition, the LTTE was known to be an active player 
in international arms smuggling and credit card fraud used order to finance its war machine. 
The LTTE is also infamous for its use of child soldiers in battle, and even in suicide 
missions. During the four year period from February 2002 to January 2006, UNICEF’s 
conservative estimates put the LTTE child recruitment at 4,347 documented cases, with the 
majority of the cases said to be undocumented, and over 36% of the documented cases involving 
children below fifteen years of age at the time of recruitment131. However, in the eyes of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora, the most significant triumph of the LTTE was the establishment of a de 
facto state in the Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka with its own legal code, court 
system, police, prison system, school system and a full civil service. It even managed time 
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differently, with the regions under its control being half an hour earlier at +5.30 GMT than the 
rest of Sri Lanka132. 
Moreover, the LTTE’s international reach was unrivaled among any terrorist 
organization133. Its international links were mainly established and facilitated through numerous 
cultural, religious, economic and relief organizations in the West, established ostensibly to cater 
to the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora134. The LTTE had absolute control over many of these 
organizations such as the Tamil Relief Organization (TRO) and the World Tamil Movement, 
both of which were later found to funnel funds to the LTTE war machine and thus banned in 
many countries135. Furthermore, by the end of 2006, the LTTE had established a “global network 
of offices and cells that spanned at least 40 countries and was unrivalled by any other insurgent 
organization worldwide136.” 
In Canada, especially Toronto, the LTTE penetration of Sri Lankan Tamil life was even 
more profound. For instance, the LTTE acted as a proxy lender to hundreds of small Sri Lankan 
Tamil businesses in areas such as Scarborough and the profits were split between the LTTE and 
the ostensible owner after the LTTE’s initial investment was recouped. Revenue accrued to the 
LTTE coffers from this practice was estimated at over one million Canadian dollars per month in 
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2001137. In addition to illegal fundraising, the LTTE leveraged numerous legitimate economic 
activities among its substantial diaspora. For instance, the “LTTE invest[ed] in stocks, money 
markets, and real estate. The LTTE also own[ed] numerous restaurants and shops throughout the 
world and ha[d] invested in farms, finance companies, and other ventures that have had high 
profit margins138.” The extensive network of Sri Lankan Tamil relief organizations in the West, 
while undoubtedly engaged in relief activities in Sri Lanka, were used to siphon off funds 
through pseudo-legitimate means, bypassing Western anti-terrorism laws139. In fact, the relief 
activities of organizations such as the TRO were held as evidence for legitimate use of funds and 
constantly used to challenge Western anti-terrorism laws on human rights and international aid 
grounds140. 
The vast international network was managed through a number of umbrella organizations 
that took orders directly from the LTTE, whether from Sri Lanka or its international offices in 
Toronto or London. The largest and the most powerful were: The Federation of Associations of 
Canadian Tamils, The International Federation of Tamils (based in the UK), The French 
Federation of Tamil Associations, The Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations, the Tamil 
Coordinating Committee in Norway and the Illankai Tamil Sangam (based in the US)141. These 
organizations are mainstays in Sri Lankan Tamil life in the West, providing social, medical, 
cultural, language, legal and numerous other services to the community while directing LTTE 
activities. This vast and sophisticated international network of LTTE, according to the United 
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States Institute of Peace, allowed the LTTE to “raise funds in one location, operate from another 
and fight in an altogether different place. This enable[d] groups like the LTTE to exploit fissures 
among law enforcement authorities and the failure of government agencies to cooperate142.” 
Therefore it is not surprising that the LTTE had a stranglehold on all Sri Lankan news 
information reaching the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The monopoly on information was used 
very effectively to impose the master narrative, taking advantage of the ignorance among the 
second generation. Over time, this master narrative discourse was normalized and accepted into 
the Sri Lankan Tamil public discourse through enforced repetition143. The foremost medium 
through which the master narrative was exported from the LTTE bases in Sri Lanka and imposed 
in the West was Tamilnet.com, the mouthpiece of the LTTE. 
 
Tamilnet 
Tamilnet’s most obvious strength in acting as the medium for LTTE’s master narrative is its 
wide readership among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, especially the technologically savvy 
second generation, who even today continue to rely on the website for news about Sri Lanka144. 
However, below the surface, its popularity is also due to the aura of legitimacy and impartiality 
pervading the website, conveyed through the frequent use of the conventional “who-what-when-
where145” structure in the articles, the absence of obvious political rhetoric and the use of 
                                                 
142  Ibid, 79 
143  This phenomenon was first observed widely among the Cuban diaspora after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The 
Cuban diaspora centered in Miami, Florida, was particularly successful in imposing its narrative based on 
anticommunism and political radicalism on the entire Cuban diaspora. See O’Reilly, Cuba, 29-30. 
144  Mark P. Whitaker, “Tamilnet.com: Some Reflections on Popular Anthropology, Nationalism and the Internet,” 
Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Summer, 2004): 480. 
145  Whitaker, Tamilnet.com, 478. 
60 
 
conditional factuality. For instance, the article, “Judge Rejects Skewed Reports on Torture 
Victims146” reads: 
The Trincomalee Magistrate Tuesday ordered that two Tamil youths, allegedly tortured in 
detention by the Sri Lankan security forces, should be examined by the Colombo Judicial Medical 
Officer, when it transpired during the proceedings that the District Medical Officers who had 
examined the young men had stated in their reports that there were no fresh wounds on the two 
suspects who have been arrested and detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act [emphasis 
added]. 
 
In this manner Tamilnet has been able to distinguish itself from other nationalistic media 
organizations that were easily dismissed as biased147. It’s neutral, yet authoritative tone is 
especially appealing to the second generation who are versed in the journalistic values of 
freedom of press, impartiality of reporting and factual reporting. However, my research on the 
26,692 news reports and the 510 feature articles that appeared on Tamilnet from June 1997 to 
May 2009 revealed that Tamilnet’s air of neutrality is a false façade concealing frequent 
misrepresentations, outright omissions, and even fabrications. For instance, in March 2009, with 
the government offensive at its peak, Tamilnet published an article with photographs titled, 
“Shelling doesn’t spare even babies in wombs148.” The excerpt read that “while four pregnant 
mothers were killed in SLA shelling on Friday inside the safe zone, another mother who was 
admitted to the make-shift hospital after injuries in her abdomen gave birth Saturday to a baby 
girl, but the hospital staff noticed the child having shrapnel on her left thigh. The newborn child 
went through a small surgery even before her first feeding, according to the medical staff at the 
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hospital in Maaththa’lan.” However, the next day, the Asia Tribune published an article claiming 
the Tamilnet article to be a fabrication after investigations proved that the photographs were 
taken 23rd September 2007149.  
Nevertheless, its widespread popularity among the second generation and its authoritative 
position as the source for other Tamil community news outlets has allowed Tamilnet to act as the 
vehicle of export to LTTE’s master narrative. In fact, Tamilnet has been so successful in 
conveying the LTTE’s master narrative that the website is banned in Sri Lanka150. 
 
The Master Narrative 
 Based on the articles from Tamilnet and the Tamil Guardian as well as my interviews in 
Toronto, I argue that the master narrative of the LTTE stands on four distinct sub-narratives. 
They are a culture of victimhood, territory, history and human rights. All Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalist discourses and community news information in Toronto can be grouped into one or 
more of these four narratives, with each reinforcing others. Through this reinforcement, each of 
the sub-narratives contributes to a synergistic strengthening of the master narrative, resulting in a 
greater urgency to mobilize on behalf of Eelam. Moreover, this master narrative is specifically 
directed toward the Sri Lankan diaspora and the international community, not the Sri Lankan 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. The first sub-narrative and the starting point to the master narrative is Sri 
Lankan Tamil victimhood. 
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Culture of Victimhood 
The culture of victimhood is based on universalizing the idea of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
victim; so as to include the entire Sri Lankan population, even those who did not experience 
victimhood first hand. The narrative portrayed the Sri Lankan Tamils as hapless victims at the 
hands of barbaric Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists and Sinhala dominated government and upheld 
the LTTE as the sole savior of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Even though accounts of victimization of 
Sri Lankan Tamils were constantly circulated with gory details, the core of the narrative and the 
spirit of victimization were firmly anchored in the riots of Black July in 1983. 
The events of Black July were 
regularly circulated among the Sri 
Lankan Tamils in Toronto and often 
parallels were drawn between events in 
1983 and a contemporary episode of 
violence in the civil war. Black July 
was the central event on which Sri 
Lankan Tamil victimhood drew its 
persistence and had become 
emblematic of the victimized Sri 
Lankan Tamil nation as described by 
the LTTE.  
The powerful emotional grip the 
events of Black July still has on the Sri 
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Lankan Tamil diaspora is best illustrated in the most widely known photograph from that period. 
Indeed, the photograph is emblematic of the spirit of victimhood conveyed by the narrative and 
is circulated widely among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora that many knew the details of the 
photograph by heart and referred to the photograph as that of the “naked man,” “naked boy” and 
“stripped man.” The photograph depicts a presumably Tamil man, naked, bloodied and 
exhausted, seated on a cement step by the roadside, his head buried in his hands and awaiting the 
final blows. His casually dressed, presumably Sinhalese tormentors appear no older than their 
unfortunate victim. One young man nonchalantly smiles as he raises his right knee in preparation 
of another blow. The photograph is so popular that poems have been written and paintings have 
been painted about the Tamil man, whose identity and fate is uncertain. 
The photograph forcefully conveys several aspects of victimization. The Tamil man has 
given-up the fight after being beaten, defeated and subjugated by his Sinhalese oppressors. He is 
stripped naked and humiliated while his tormentors seem to enjoy themselves. Moreover, 
frighteningly the Sinhalese men seem to be no older than their Tamil victim and may well have 
been a neighbor, a classmate or a workmate, who may have taken the same bus as the Tamil 
man. Furthermore, the anonymity of the actors conveys the fact that the victim and the 
perpetrators could have been anyone; that no Tamil is safe in Sri Lanka from their Sinhalese 
neighbors. The surroundings of the photograph too convey the universality of Sri Lankan Tamil 
victimhood. The small “tea-shop” by the street side elevated by a cement step is ubiquitous in Sri 
Lanka and exists in both villages and cities, serving people everything from cigarettes, tea, and 
coffee to soap. The familiarity with and the ubiquity of the tea-shop, no doubt convey the 
universality of Sri Lankan Tamil victimhood.   
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This emphasis on victimhood, centered on Black July, has also led to the development of a 
“culture of victimhood” among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, a phenomenon widely observed 
among the Jews after the Holocaust and the Palestinians after the Nakba151. The development of 
a culture based on victimhood means that those who did not directly experience the core event of 
victimization also begin to internalize the thought of victimhood and thus can be included in the 
experience of victimization. In other words, the development of cultures of victimhood 
transforms the suffering of a part of the society into a collective possession. According to 
Emmanuel Sivan, this means that “young people, uninitiated into the actual experience, carry 
emotion-laden stories very effectively152.” 
Therefore, the second generation is initiated into the sense of collective victimization, by the 
narrative, even though they have never experienced direct victimization. Sivan also notes that 
having been thoroughly inculcated into victimhood, for the second generation, the narratives of 
“suffering can approximate personal suffering153,” which allows the LTTE to harness the force of 
the diaspora, including the second generation toward the realization of Eelam. Consequently, the 
narrative’s focus on Black July has become a powerful tool in mobilizing the diaspora, 
particularly the second generation diaspora. It does not merely encourage passivity, but incites 
the diaspora into activism toward realizing Eelam, the only rectification for the wrongs of Black 
July. 
To this end, the Sri Lankan Tamils in the diaspora are constantly exposed to highly 
emotional and evocative photographs and stories depicted in the most gruesome manner and 
parallels drawn with Black July in 1983. These photographs and stories, first appearing on 
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Tamilnet, are later circulated widely in other media such as the Tamil Guardian newspaper. A 
news article in June 2006 titled, “SLA Soldiers Massacre Family of Four in Vankalai, 
Mannar154” said: 
SLA soldiers armed with bayonets and knives entered the house of a family of four and 
slaughtered 35-year-old father, 27-year-old mother, 9-year-old daughter and 7-year-old son 
Thursday midnight in Vankalai, 12 km southeast of Mannar. Eyewitnesses in the area, 
Thomaspuri Ward No 10 in Vankalai, have told Mannar Additional Magistrate that they could 
identify the soldiers involved in the massacre. Villagers alleged the mother was raped before the 
massacre. Tension prevails in Vankalai. Religious leaders including the Bishop of Mannar, 
parliamentarians and civil society members in Mannar have rushed to site. Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission officials have visited the massacre site. 
 
 The photographs depicted the scene of the massacre with horrifying details and showed the 
father and the two children still hung with their clothes soaked in blood from repeated stabbing, 
the boy disemboweled, his insides falling to the ground and used condoms on the floor. While 
Tamilnet reported the massacre in its usual authoritative tone, the incident in fact was marred in 
such ambiguities and the witnesses not forthcoming, that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the 
independent mission established to monitor the ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan government, refused to assign responsibility to any party and omitted any mention of 
the massacre in any of its weekly monitoring reports and statements155. 
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 Another instance of propagating victimhood, is the widely publicized pictures of Sri Lankan 
Army soldiers, first appearing in Tamilnet, then in Tamil Guardian that are depicted in a 
manner specifically intended to arouse highly emotional responses. The front page photograph 
in Tamil Guardian, published on September 20, 2006156, depicted a Sri Lanka army soldier 
holding a gun, dressed in a military raincoat, wearing a black mask, a helmet and goggles. The 
caption read: “Sri Lanka’s military is being blamed for the abductions.” The cover story title 
read: “Death squads unleash wave of 
terror.” For any Sri Lankan, 
Sinhalese or Tamil, past and present, 
the soldier dressed in military garb, 
holding his AK-47 is iconic of an 
era in which the Sri Lankan 
government was responsible for the 
deaths of tens of thousands of 
Sinhalese and Tamil citizens during 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
 The photograph, along with the 
captions, specifically appeal to the 
images and emotions ingrained in 
the Sri Lankan Tamils who migrated 
during the period when black 
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masked soldiers roamed the streets of Sri Lanka. Constantly exposed to images such as these, 
the second generation has been thoroughly immersed in the culture of victimhood. 
     Moreover, article titles such as, “Loud echoes of a bloody past157,” “Genocide charges 
ready: many consider the organized pogrom of 1983, where over 3,000 Tamils were killed in 
Colombo alone, as one of the long list of indicators of the ongoing, slow genocide of Tamil in Sri 
Lanka158,” and “State orchestrated violence raises spectre of 1983 pogrom159” were 
commonplace on Tamilnet and in the Tamil Guardian, explicitly drawing parallels between 
present events and those in 1983.  
 Another, more potent medium, in which the culture of victimization is conveyed, is cinema, 
especially movies and documentaries, a number of which have appeared in the West since 2000. 
The most recent and by far the most popular among the second generation was Aanivaer, 
meaning “original root” or one’s origins. The movie which premiered in Toronto in September 
2006 was related to me by many second generation Sri Lankan Tamils as a must-see. The story 
narrates the journey of a female South Indian reporter, Sandhya, and her companion, Dr. Nanda, 
a Sri Lankan Tamil living in LTTE-controlled regions. The movie is especially powerful as it 
forcefully brings to life well known incidents in the Sri Lankan civil war. One such episode is 
when Tamil civilians are shredded under an army tank, which left flesh scattered across the road. 
Another episode is when a Tamil school girl is ambushed, while riding her bicycle, by a group of 
Sri Lankan soldiers who assault and rape her. Later the personal pain of such incidents are 
powerfully conveyed by Dr. Nanda who refuses to identify the body of the girl, now dug out of 
the muddy ground, because he was fond of her. Even though, most Sri Lankan Tamils have 
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heard or read about the events depicted in the movie, Aanivaer’s depiction of these events brings 
an added immediacy to Sri Lankan Tamil victimhood and evokes the most powerful emotions in 
its viewers. Interestingly, the movie never mentions the LTTE which afforded the movie 




The culture of victimhood is directly used to justify Eelam, the separate Tamil homeland. 
Having harnessed the emotions of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, especially the second 
generation, into a powerful force of mobilization through the inculcation of a culture of 
victimhood, the LTTE embarked on giving that mobilized force a direction and a more specific 
target - territory. This was achieved by the narrative of territory, in which Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism was decisively territorialized160 and the borders of Tamil Eelam carved in stone, the 
need for which was legitimized by Sri Lankan Tamil victimhood. 
Given the Sri Lankan Tamils’ attachment to land, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
territorialization of nationalism may have been achieved relatively easily. To be sure, 
territorialization was a process that had begun long before the LTTE came to monopolize the 
nationalist discourse. For instance, in the Vaddukoddai Resolution – the first official call for 
Eelam – announced on May 14th 1976, “that the State of Tamil Eelam shall consist of the people 
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of Northern and Eastern Provinces161 and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of 
the State of Tamil Eelam to all Tamil speaking people living in any part of Ceylon…162” 
However, the defining characteristic of the LTTE’s narrative of territory is its exclusiveness. The 
case of Muslims in the Northern Province best illustrates the exclusivity. Despite the official 
LTTE rhetoric of mutual understanding between the Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims, by the mid 
1990s, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the LTTE had managed to expel both Muslims and the 
small Sinhalese populations in the Northern Province to make the province almost exclusively 
Sri Lankan Tamil. Also, as mentioned before, the expulsion of Muslims has been thoroughly 
censored in LTTE propaganda and from the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils. 
On the other hand, territorialization is most evident in the language used in LTTE 
propaganda, particularly the articles from Tamilnet and the Tamil Guardian. For instance, six 
months after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Tamil Guardian carried an article titled, “Has the 
long wait for Eelam ended?” The article suggested that “the Tsunami did what a violent ethnic 
conflict couldn’t. It made Eelam, the Tamil homeland, a de facto reality163.” Another article titled 
“Strengthening Homeland Security164” spoke about the security measures taken by the LTTE to 
prevent an “invasion of homeland.” By 2009, the use of language suggesting Tamil national 
boundaries was so widespread that catchphrases such as “Sinhala colonizing,” “conquering 
Sinhalese army,” “invasion of Tamil homeland,” and “national defense” appeared several times 
each week on Tamilnet and in every issue of the Tamil Guardian. Furthermore, the demand for 
exclusive territory is both justified and reinforced by Sri Lankan Tamil historiography. 
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   Just as territory is justified based on victimhood, the narrative of history seeks to justify 
territory and victimhood. The territorialization of nationalism is reinforced and justified through 
“inventing165” a historical territorial tradition for Eelam. In this respect, the narrative of history 
included a vast array of historical lessons and facts, carefully argued to convey the idea that the 
Sri Lankan Tamils have always constituted a unified nation, inhabiting the Eelam lands 
exclusively166. The inclusion of the district of Puttlam in Eelam best illustrates the use of history 
to justify territory. For instance, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamils diaspora in Canada now 
hold that the entire North and the East Provinces and the district of Puttlam from the 
Northwestern Province constitute the traditional Sri Lankan Tamil homeland. While Tamils have 
traditionally lived in the Northern and Eastern regions of the island, the areas they inhabited were 
far smaller than the regions that constitute the present day North and East Provinces167, the 
boundaries of which were first drawn by the British in the 1800s for strictly administrative 
purposes and only marginally changed since. Therefore, they are purely administrative 
boundaries indicating no historically ethnic demarcations168. 
The Puttlam district was not inhabited by Sri Lankan Tamils in a large scale until the civil 
war. By 2001, hundreds of thousands of displaced from the North and the East have been settled 
in Puttlam, both Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamil speaking Muslims, largely in refugee camps. In 
fact, a large majority of the displaced, accounting for the majority of the population increase in 
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167  Peebles, History of Sri Lanka, 32, 37. 
168  Ibid., 54. 
71 
 
the district, are the Muslims who fled the North due to LTTE expulsions in 1990169. Even with 
the displaced Sri Lankan Tamils included, the Sri Lankan Tamils only accounted for 6.8% of the 
population of the Puttlam district in 2001170. Thus, Puttlam never had a large Sri Lankan Tamil 
population, but is now considered part of the historical Tamil homeland. The change in history is 
best illustrated by maps used by the LTTE to denote Eelam. This inclusion of Puttlam in Eelam 
is accepted without question among the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto. 
 
The map to the left, on a stamp issued in 1983 by the LTTE, depicts Eelam without the district of Puttlam. The map 
to the right, published on Tamil Canadian website in 2007, depicts Eelam with the district of Puttlam. 
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The second function of the narrative of history is to reinforce the culture of victimhood. This 
is achieved through the reinterpretation of past instances of Sri Lankan Tamil subjugation in light 
of present conditions. Because there are many instances in which this occurs on Tamilnet and in 
the Tamil Guardian, I will only focus on the word “Genocide” which is particularly illuminating 
of this phenomenon as it became the buzz word during the final phase of the war. For instance, 
on Tamilnet, the word genocide appeared only eleven times during the five year period from July 
1997 to July 2002. From 2002 to the beginning of 2008, the word becomes more widely used. 
From 2008 onward, the word genocide is used almost on a daily basis. Nevertheless, despite its 
recent ubiquity and the claims of genocide since independence, the word was not applied even to 
Black July in the 1990s. 
The second February issue of the Tamil Guardian in 2009 was dedicated to genocide and 
ethnic cleansing of Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka. The issue171 which carried article titles such 
as “Long term concentration camps for Tamils says Sri Lanka,” “SLA turns first safety zone into 
a killing field, proposes new zone,” “Sri Lanka in systematic genocide” and “Genocide in Sri 
Lanka” reminded the readers of the “slow and systematic genocide of Tamils that began in 
1983.” Similarly, the Tamil Guardian’s first issue for March 2009 carried an article titled “The 
diaspora as genocide resisters” which suggested “structural similarities between the genocide of 
the Tamils and other historic genocides including the Nazi and Rwandan examples172.” By May, 
five days before the war was officially declared over by the government, the Tamil Guardian’s 
front page headline read in massive red letters: “Our Holocaust: the struggle for Tamil Eelam is 
entering a new phase173.” The article spoke of the “slow genocide underway in Sri Lanka since 
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independence” and asserted that the “Tamil nation’s experience of holocaust” is only the latest in 
the “sixty-year old genocide of Tamils.” 
However, as mentioned before, genocide was not used widely until 2002 and was not used 
to refer to Black July until same year. For instance, in July 1998, a Tamilnet’s article titled, 
“Toronto Tamils mark Black July174” spoke of the “anti Tamil pogrom of 1983 in Sri Lanka.” In 
1999, an article titled, “Students mark Black July 83175” mentioned that “picketing was arranged 
to mark the July 83 communal riots…” On the other hand, in 2001, in one of the first uses of 
genocide, an article on Tamnilnet titled, “Controversial weapon meant for genocide alleges 
MP176” said “The Sri Lankan government is going to deploy chemical weapons against the 
Tamils in the island’s north and east. The aim is to annihilate them totally.” By 2006, genocide 
was liberally applied to past atrocities, particularly Black July. For instance, in April 2006, a 
Tamilnet article said that “like the July 1983 genocidal pogrom against the Tamils, the current 
violence against the Tamil speaking people has been unleashed in Trincomalee with the 
connivance of the SL Navy177.” Apart from drawing obvious parallels with Black July, the article 
also reinterpreted history to mark Black July as genocide.  
In the narrative of history, the LTTE is assisted by Sri Lankan Tamil historiography. For 
instance, conforming to a widely observed phenomenon among other groups engaged in national 
struggles, Sri Lankan Tamil historiography shares similarities with Palestinian historiography 
which according to Litvak is still in the “uncritical and unreflecting phase in which only those 
themes and elements that serve the national cause are accepted, established maxims and truths 
remain unchallenged, and evidence that runs counter to the national cause is ignored or 
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dismissed as false or hostile178.” An overwhelming majority of the works on the Sri Lankan civil 
war and ethnic conflict passed on as historical studies are written by Sri Lankan Tamil 
professionals in the diaspora, rarely practicing academic standards on the use of historical 




Finally, the emphasis on genocide in the narrative of history points toward the more recent 
sub-narrative of human rights within the master narrative of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. For 
instance, Margo Kleinfeld, writing in 2005 about the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE says 
that recently “the rights-based territorial discourses have emerged to enhance the old historical 
justifications for territorial authority. New narratives based upon fulfilling or denying human 
rights have been put to work linking authority to territory based upon moral fitness and 
unfitness…180” In this way, the sub-narrative of human rights reinforces the other narratives of 
victimhood, territory and history. For Kleinfeld, the emergence of the human rights discourse is 
directly linked to the inability of both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to stabilize 
their territory181 as evidenced by the shifting borders between the two sides with the shifting 
tides in military operations during the 1990s and the early 2000s before the peace process began 
in 2002.  
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She further notes that “each belligerent capitalizes on human rights abuses” and uses 
international vocabulary of human rights by “magnifying the violence perpetuated by the other 
and making it attractive to international media” consumption182. The two foremost issues used by 
the two sides to demonize the other, according to Kleinfeld, are terrorism and children with each 
attempting to prove the “moral unfitness of the other183.” The Tamil Guardian and Tamilnet 
again actively engaged in propagating the human rights narrative. 
Corroborating Kleinfeld’s thesis, human rights figures prominently on Tamilnet only after 
the peace process began in 2002. The phenomenon is best evident in Tamilnet and the Tamil 
Guardian articles in response to the banning of LTTE as a terrorist organization by the United 
Kingdom and the European Union. The United Kingdom banned the LTTE in 2001 and the 
European Union in 2006. The responses from LTTE propaganda were conspicuously different in 
their framing. In 2001 an article read, quoting the LTTE, “the British decision to include the 
LTTE on the list of proscribed terrorist organisations will impose severe restraints on the current 
peace initiatives undertaken by the Norwegian Government to resolve the civil war in Sri 
Lanka184.” The article further stressed that “the British decision will encourage the repressive Sri 
Lankan regime to be more uncompromising” and that “the peace initiatives depend precariously 
on the leniency or the harshness in which this draconian legislation will be implemented by the 
law enforcing agencies in Britain.”  
On the other hand, in 2006, a long article blames the European Union on being complicit on 
its human rights record, “despite evidence of government human rights abuses in Sri Lanka185.” 
The article further blames the European Union for “tacitly accepting the recent military 
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atrocities” and “failing to use its substantial leverage to curb these abuses.” Furthermore, 
according to the article, “the EU has revealed the hollowness of its principled defenses of human 
rights.” “Despite the rhetoric, rights are not that big a deal” for the European Union. The change 
in language from 2001 to 2006 in denouncing the proscription of the LTTE is revealing of the 
newly adopted narrative of human rights.  
Moreover, the LTTE also sought to deflect the perennial charges of child recruitment 
directed against the organization. The manner in which the LTTE deflected the charges, 
particularly the language used, is again revealing of the narrative of human rights. For instance, 
in 2005, following UNICEF accusations of child recruitment, the LTTE political wing leader, 
Thamilselvan, gave an interview to Tamilnet which was published by the Tamil Guardian under 
the title: “Most complains about child recruitment come from areas controlled by the 
military186.” Thamilselvan firmly places the blame on the government’s human rights record and 
emphasizes the LTTE’s welfare efforts toward children. According to him “no one denies the 
fact that the deplorable conditions in which our children find themselves today were brought 
about by the genocidal policies perpetuated on the Tamils by successive Sinhala governments for 
more than fifty years and by the war it waged on our people for the last thirty years.”  
Finally, in examining the narrative of human rights, the synergistic nature of the master 
narrative becomes clear. Sri Lankan Tamil victimhood justifies the claims on territory which is 
justified based on reinterpretation of history which emphasizes violations of Sri Lankan Tamil 
human rights which in turn reinforces the culture of victimhood. This master narrative is widely 
imposed and accepted in Toronto, particularly among the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils 
that a cursory glance at the catch phrases and the boards held in the demonstrations in Toronto 
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revealed the extent of the prevalence of the master narrative. Most sighted catchphrases included 
“Stop Genocide,” “Massacre of Children and Mothers,” “Sri Lanka kills (insert number here) 


































Chapter 5  
The Catalyst: The Final Phase of the Civil War and Cyber Nation 
The Final Phase 
The final phase of the civil war in Sri Lanka began with the fall of Kilinochchi, the LTTE 
administrative capital, to the government forces on January 2, 2009 and lasted until May 18th 
when Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE was announced dead187. The fall of Kilinochchi came 
as a shock to many Sri Lankans, both Sinhalese and Tamil, who for decades had firmly believed 
that the LTTE was militarily undefeatable. Moreover, as the administrative capital of LTTE’s de 
facto state for over a decade, Kilinochchi had been thoroughly fortified and the LTTE had vowed 
to defend it at all costs188. As late as December, 2008, the LTTE was describing Kilinochchi as 
the graveyard of the overconfident government forces189. 
However, what followed soon after the fall of Kilinochchi, shocked the world even more. 
The LTTE military machine, much touted as invincible before, collapsed in the face of 
government advances. In less than two weeks, the entire Jaffna peninsula fell to government 
forces and the peninsula was declared “cleared” on January 14, 2009190. Soon after, on January 
25, 2009, Mullaitivu, the LTTE military base and the final stronghold, fell to government 
forces191. By the end of March, the LTTE was reduced to controlling less than one square-
kilometer of land in Sri Lanka. For the first time in more than two decades, the LTTE ceased to 
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be a military player in Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE would hold a last stand, which proved to 
be a disaster for the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
After the fall of Kilinochchi and the rapid military advances, the government established a 
“No-Fire Zone,” for the civilians to escape the military operations. However, in an ironic twist, 
by early April, the entire LTTE leadership had retreated to the no-fore zone with more than two 
hundred thousand Sri Lankan Tamil civilians. Soon the seventeen square-kilometer coastal patch 
of land was fortified by the LTTE and its Tamil civilians held by force as a human shield. For 
about a month until the defeat of the LTTE, the no-fire zone saw the bloodiest episode in the 
three decade long Sri Lankan civil war. The government was accused of using heavy weapons 
against the civilians, including artillery fire and indiscriminate shelling of the no-fire zone. The 
LTTE was accused of holding the civilians as a human shield by force and killing those who 
attempted escape from the LTTE192. By the end of the war, the estimates of civilian casualties in 
the no-fire zone ranged from six thousand to twenty thousand193. 
***** 
 During this period, the master narrative was imposed in full force on the second generation 
Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto. As mentioned in the Fourth Chapter, daily accounts of Sri Lankan 
Tamil victimization, from mass murders, shelling of hospitals, dead and dismembered children 
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and raped girls to starving mothers, were widely circulated, often with horrifying details 
accompanied with gory pictures. Moreover, the events were described in politically highly 
charged language as evidence by the frequent use of phrases such as “Sinhala colonization” 
“invading Sinhalese armies” and “homeland security.” The ubiquitous use of the word genocide, 
now referring back to events in decades past and the human rights violations of Sri Lankan 
Tamils, disregarded by international actors, exacerbated the sense of victimization and need for a 
separate exclusive homeland – Eelam.  
 The master narrative almost effortlessly took hold of the second generation for two main 
reasons. The first was their ignorance or unawareness, manifested as a result of the first 
generation’s larger-than-life remembrance of Eelam and forgetting of differences. The Tamil 
Guardian and Tamilnet, for their part, reinforced the second generation unawareness. For 
instance, from September 2008 to February 2009, the pride of LTTE propaganda was the 
recently formed Air Force of the LTTE, also called Air Tigers and Tamileelam Air Force (TAF). 
The Tamil Guardian published several articles on Air Tigers with many pictures and Tamilnet 
devoted more than fifteen articles to the TAF during the period.  
 Two of such articles, first published in April 2007 and reprinted in November 2008 and 
January 2009, were titled “Air Tigers: Human Capital gathered against the odds” and “The 
LTTE’s air power has been developed in the harshest international climate ever for armed 
movements194.” The articles further said that the “post 9/11 era, with its attendant global 
antiterrorism drives, has arguably been the most difficult period in which the LTTE has had to 
develop any of its military capabilities. That it was able to acquire the sophisticated equipment, 
the supplies and, especially, the extensive know-how to run an air force, not matter how small, is 
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no mean feat.” Further the articles stated that “the sheer scale of this institutional exercise is 
demonstrated by the extent of the external support that Sri Lanka relies in for its own air 
operations. Despite being 18,000 strong, the SLAF still relies heavily on foreign personnel…” 
The references to Sri Lankan Tamil industry and the lack thereof among the Sinhalese are too 
obvious to mention. Incidentally, the tiger air force was one of the favorite stories that arose 
during my interviews. Everyone I interviewed knew a great deal about the LTTE air force and 
most held it as an example of a great step forward in economic and technological prowess in 
Eelam. Tamil Guardian called it a “quantum leap in Tamil Tigers’ technological base195.” 
 Furthermore, the protests and LTTE propaganda also focused on Sri Lankan Tamil 
solidarity while disregarding differences. Caste and Indian Tamils were not mentioned even once 
and the Muslims were mentioned only as equal victims of Sinhalese oppression with no mention 
of their expulsion from the Northern Province or other atrocities committed by the LTTE on the 
Muslims. However, the disregarding of differences was a consequence of long term LTTE 
propaganda. For instance, mention of caste is noticeably absent in the two news sources. The 
Tamil Guardian never mentions caste and Tamilnet mentions caste in only three occasions in 
over 27,200 articles. In fact, caste was last mentioned in March 1998 under the title “Caste 
clashes on the increase in Jaffna196.”  
The Muslims in the East, on the other hand, merited frequent mention as the LTTE 
propaganda attempted to portray the Muslims as equal victims of Sinhalese aggression. A typical 
article would stress the common fate of Muslims and Sri Lankan Tamils and the oppression of 
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both groups by the Sinhalese. More significantly, the expulsion of Muslims from the Northern 
Province was never mentioned during the entire period except once197.  
In February 2005, the Tamil Guardian devoted almost half of its second February issue198 to 
Sri Lankan Tamil-Muslim relations. One article title read: “LTTE and Muslim leaders seek 
communal amity. Tamil Eelam has to be won on the basis of Muslim Tamil unity.” The article 
further quoted a Muslim who said that “first they [Sinhalese] divided us. Then they divided you. 
Sinhala leaders will always deny our rights.” Significantly, the article never mentioned the 
expulsions, but only that “in the course of time, there were differences and contradictions” 
between the two communities. The editorial title of the same issue read: “United Front: Sri 
Lanka has equal disdain for Tamils and Muslims.” This pattern of emphasizing Sri Lankan Tamil 
and Muslim unity was continued throughout the period covered in the research. 
The LTTE’s effort to erase differences was even more pronounced in the case of a split 
within the organization in March 2004. During the period of the peace process, the commander 
of the LTTE military operations in the Eastern Province broke away from the LTTE. The 
commander, popularly known as Karuna, proclaimed a list of Eastern Sri Lankan Tamil 
grievances against the “Northern” LTTE leadership and sought the protection of the Sri Lankan 
government199. Interestingly, one of the major grievances of the Karuna faction was that the 
Eastern cadres, while being the majority within the LTTE was not used to protect the East, but 
were deployed in defending the North. Furthermore, Eastern senior commanders were slighted in 
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favor of Northern commanders for leadership positions within the LTTE ranks. Karuna 
proclaimed that the Northern leadership relegated the Eastern Sri Lankan Tamils to a second 
class within the organization which referred back to the mutual distrust the Eastern and Northern 
Tamils shared200. 
However, in the Tamil media, the “Karuna split” was portrayed in a drastically different 
manner, which highlighted Tamil solidarity. In a remarkable twist, LTTE propaganda managed 
to depict the split as an exceptional contradiction which proved Tamil solidarity. Ignoring the 
widespread support the Karuna faction enjoyed among the Eastern Tamils at the beginning, the 
LTTE depicted the split as a result of a mentally unstable, capricious commander lusting for 
more power. The propaganda essentially represented the leadership of the Karuna faction as 
isolated from its people and spoke of Eastern Tamils seeking the LTTE’s support against the 
tyrannical Karuna faction. The LTTE propaganda went from initial denial, to vehement attack 
against the moral fitness and the human rights record of Karuna. On March 03, 2004 a Tamilnet 
article read: “No Regional Split201.” Only three days later a title read: “Karuna Removed from 
the LTTE202.” A day later an article condemned Karuna as Pol Pot and stressed that in the 
Eastern Province, “thousands of our people carried photos of our national leader with the slogan 
‘Tamils are Tigers. Tigers are Tamils203.’” A few days later Tamilnet said that “Karuna 
embezzled funds [and that he] feared disciplinary action before split.204” The message was 
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finally driven home later in the articles titled: “Karuna’s associate returns to LTTE205” and “no 
force can destroy Tamil unity206.” 
Majority of the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils I interviewed in Toronto seemed to 
have bought into the LTTE version of events which suggested the success of its propaganda. Out 
of the thirty-four I interviewed, only four Sri Lankan Tamils thought that the Eastern Tamils had 
legitimate grievances against the LTTE leadership207. Twenty-eight people believed the LTTE 
that Karuna was a power hungry leader isolated from his own Eastern Tamils. Remarkably, this 
was one of the few topics that did not elicit a single half hearted answer. Everyone seemed to 
have a strong opinion about dissent within the LTTE. The four who disagreed either suggested 
directly or implied that the LTTE should allow dissent of opinion within the organization. Most 
agreed with the LTTE that the split was the result of an elaborate conspiracy by the Sinhalese 
government, designed to weaken the unity of the Sri Lankan Tamil people. 
 In this way, the LTTE propaganda was in line with the remembrance and forgetting of the 
first generation and sought to further the second generation’s unawareness or ignorance, which 
was simultaneously taken advantage of by the LTTE to impress the master narrative on them. 
The imposition of the master narrative was facilitated by the fact that the Sri Lankan Tamil 
nation, particularly among the diaspora, is a cyber nation more than a territorial nation.    
 
Cyber Nation 
According to Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “it can no longer be taken for granted that the people 
who identify with a given nation inhabit the same space, nor can be assumed that cultural 
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homogenization takes place at the level of the nation through mass media208.” He continues that 
the internet can “be exceptionally efficient [in] reproducing identities across vast distances, 
utilizing dispersed populations in virtual communities because it can fully exploit the time-space 
compression characterizing our era.” Eriksen further stresses that the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee 
dispora, along with the Kurdish diaspora, is one of the most active nations in the cyber space and 
that “as a result of the widespread activity on the web among scattered diasporas like the Kurdish 
and the Tamil refugees, many have developed a sense of belonging to a community, which 
would otherwise have been difficult to achieve209.”  
Shyam Tekwani, who has studied the Sri Lankan civil war since 1983, agrees with Eriksen 
and notes that “Eelam does not exist on any map. It is not recognized by any international body 
or any other nation, but for the two million Sri Lankan Tamils scattered across the globe, it is a 
nation that already exists in cyber space210.” He continues: “The Sri Lankan Tamil movement is 
among the pioneers in using the Internet to communicate with an international audience. The Sri 
Lankan Tamil Diaspora is one of the most networked groups in the world, maintaining dozens of 
websites engaged in keeping alive the Tamil struggle for a separate state called Eelam…211” And 
that “unlike many other Diaspora sites which use the Internet for interactions of a more social 
and cultural nature, such as those of various Indian Diaspora and other immigrant groups even 
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the sites maintained by the Tamil Diaspora ostensibly for cultural purposes are charged with the 
politics of Eelam212.” 
The advantages of the internet are obvious. It greatly enhances the propaganda of 
nationalism because it is cheap, easy to use, difficult to censor and is unrestricted by physical 
boundaries. Moreover, as Tekwani notes: 
The Internet enables separatists to frame their actions and their ideologies in the manner of their 
choice without the intervention of government or media censors and gatekeepers. This last is 
perhaps the single most important advantage of the Internet over other media technologies, new 
and old. Through their web sites separatist groups can now frame their ideologies and their actions 
to suit their needs and the political and social environment they function in. The Internet enables 
such movements to focus their message on their cause rather than the actions reported in the mass 
media. The Internet allows them to tout the greatness of their cause in a web site hundreds of 
thousands of miles removed from the acts of violence the group is engaged in on the ground. The 
Internet allows these groups to frame their political discourse in a manner that portrays them as 
statesmen rather than terrorists. Most importantly for ethno separatist movements such as the Sri 
Lankan Tamils, it enables the creation of a virtual homeland which serves to keep alive the cause 
and engender a sense of belonging and community that years of violence and waves of migration 
may have otherwise eroded213.  
***** 
No discussion on nationalism is complete today without considering the approach of 
Benedict Anderson. Anderson, a leading academic in the modernist school, emphasizes the 
political and social processes tied to modernity, secularism and capitalism, all of which 
contributed to the dissemination of the written word through “print capitalism,” facilitating the 
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development of collective national mobilization214. Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, especially 
diasporic long distance nationalism, can be better understood by extrapolating Anderson’s thesis 
to the observations made by Eriksen and Tekwani. Cyber space, has been the main tool that 
ushered in Sri Lankan Tamil diasporic mobilization, especially that of the second generation; a 
sort of “digital capitalism,” in which the internet, similar to the newspaper and the novel in 
Anderson’s print capitalism, created a new sense of space and time, resulting in a greater sense 
of community among the diaspora. 
However, what is unique about the second generation Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is that 
there is no majority common language. Many in the second generation can only understand 
spoken Tamil and cannot read or write in Tamil. Instead, thousands speak, read and write in 
English, French, German, Dutch, Danish, and Italian etc. Nevertheless, the internet, with sites 
such as Tamilnet with English, French, German and Tamil translations, has allowed them to 
receive the same message, albeit in different languages; a sort of speaking the same language 
without speaking the same language.  
It is this fact, that they constitute a cyber nation, along with their unawareness, that allowed 
the LTTE to impose its master narrative, based on the four sub-narratives of victimhood, 
territory, history and human rights, which in turn provided a strong impetus to mobilize against 
what the second generation Sri Lankan Tamils saw as the continued victimization of a united 
Tamil people, in a historically legitimate Tamil nation, by invading Sinhalese armies, who 
continued to violate the Tamils’ human rights and perpetuated decades long genocide.  
 
 
                                                 





The inspiration for the project occurred to me during my junior year abroad in London from 
September 2008 to June 2009, which coincided with a period of momentous developments in the 
Sri Lankan civil war and within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. In September 2008, the LTTE 
was still very much at large albeit besieged and the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in London yet to 
be mobilized. By June, when I left London, I had seen tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils 
protest in the streets causing massive traffic jams in Central London, a seventy-four day 
continuous protest of several hundred Sri Lankan Tamils at the Westminster, a Heroes Day rally 
in East London for the LTTE “martyrs,” seen black flag days in Sri Lankan Tamil dominated 
Wembley and had been urged to pretend to be an Indian while visiting Wembley. 
The change within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, particularly the second generation, was as 
sweeping as it was unexpected. For two decades, the diaspora had been passive actors in the Sri 
Lankan civil war, funding the LTTE military machine and carrying out its propaganda in the 
West, while contributing to Sri Lankan Tamil humanitarian agencies. However, within a span of 
few months, in early 2009, the diaspora had mobilized full force across the world, in Toronto, 
London, Paris, Oslo, Geneva, Dusseldorf and Melbourne etc. Thousands took to the streets, 
thousands wrote to their governments to intervene against the Sri Lankan government and 
thousands more sought to educate their Western peers about the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
The Sri Lankan Tamil community in Toronto, the largest of the Sri Lankan Tamil diasporic 
communities, particularly stood out because of its numbers. 
However, as the Western governments failed to force the Sri Lankan government quit its 
military offensive and failed to make the LTTE lay its arms down, the civil war continued until 
the bitter end with tens of thousands of casualties. In Sri Lanka, the diaspora’s protests fell on 
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deaf ears, partly because of strict censorship by the government and partly because the diaspora 
was easily dismissed as non stakeholders of the civil war. The second generation, which had for 
the first time come to the fore, was particularly dismissed as brainwashed, misinformed and 
misguided. 
A systematic analysis of second generation Sri Lankan Tamils’ activism proved difficult 
given the lack of an agreed upon analytical framework in history and anthropology. Diaspora 
activism, be it Sri Lankan Tamil, Cuban, Palestinian or Sikh, is largely looked upon as a 
collective phenomenon without distinctions across generations. The concepts of memory and 
forgetting too have been largely applied to the first generations who immigrated while their 
manifestations in subsequent generations remain mostly understudied. Even among global 
diasporas, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is understudied partly as a result of the confusing space 
they occupy between nationality and ethnicity. As mentioned in the introduction, they share 
Tamil ethnicity with South Indian nationals while sharing Sri Lankan nationality with ethnic 
Sinhalese among others.  
This thesis used the concepts of memory and forgetting, widely used to study other 
diasporas, with a diasporic Sri Lankan Tamil perceptive. Large houses and an ethic of hard work 
and industry were used to show how the remembrance among the first generation, driven by their 
attachment to land, is translated in the second generation memory into a larger-than-life image of 
Eelam. Similarly, forgetting among the first generation, driven again by the trauma of 
displacement from land as well as egalitarian pressures in Canada, is also translated in the second 
generation into a sense of universal Sri Lankan Tamil brotherhood. The examples of caste and 
regional identities were used as subjects to analyze the above phenomenon. The resulting 
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ignorance or unawareness in the second generation, manifested in disjointed narratives and gaps 
in understanding, made them particularly receptive to the master narrative of the LTTE.  
The master narrative of the LTTE, consisting of four mutually reinforcing sub-narratives of 
victimhood, territory, history and human rights set the parameters for Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalist discourse. Almost all discussions and information can be fit into one or more of these 
sub-narratives. The intensive use of the internet in LTTE’s propaganda in early 2009, with the 
internet’s characteristic property of compressing time and space, made the events back in Sri 
Lanka seem particularly acute to those in Toronto, which providing the motivation for tens of 
thousands of second generation Sri Lankan Tamils to take to the streets. 
   Today the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora continues to play a pivotal role in the ethnic conflict 
in Sri Lanka. According to Tamilnet, “it is a well known fact that one of the fundamental 
strengths of Eezham Tamils is the diaspora, without the involvement of which nothing decisive 
can take place in Sri Lanka215.” Their wealth and human capital will be crucial to the rebuilding 
of large parts of the island devastated by more than two decades of brutal civil war. Moreover, 
the coming of age of second generation nationalist activism will have profound effects on the 
still precarious situation in Sri Lanka. Their relationship with Sri Lanka and the methods they use 
to espouse Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism (use of cyber space for example) will be different from 
those of their parents. Accordingly, Sri Lanka will have to change its strategy in its relations with 
the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. No matter the course Sri Lanka eventually chooses, be it sincere 
accommodation or outright hostility, it will no longer be able to dismiss the collective 
mobilization of the second generation Sri Lankan diaspora. 
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